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INTRODUCTION
Paradoxically, the American health-care system produces both ther-
apeutic gains and major discrepancies in access to quality care. Medical
advances have improved patients' lives dramatically, yet stark inequali-
ties in access, quality, financial burdens, and resource priorities under-
mine the impact of technological and scientific progress. The cost of
HEALTH, CAPABILITY, AND JUSTICE
health care is also on the rise.' Although providers, lawyers, ethicists,
and health-policy experts have addressed these issues many times, few
proposals for reform have succeeded. The failure of the Clinton Admin-
istration's 1993-94 health reform efforts illustrates the problem's com-
plexity. Currently, physicians increasingly face the ethical dilemma of
restricting access to necessary medical care when health insurers, state
governments, and managed care organizations make, or require them to
make, rationing decisions. Moreover, the effect of a 2004 Supreme Court
ruling is that patients have little recourse in suing their health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) for denial of care. 2 There is little consen-
sus about how to ensure equal access, allocate scarce resources, or define
a benefits package.
Health ethics, policy and law offer numerous approaches to address
these issues, which have generally, though not exhaustively, fallen into
five categories. The first proposes welfare economic and utilitarian
schemes that rely on cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, or cost-benefit anal-
yses to aggregate costs and benefits and thus maximize social welfare.
3
Libertarian theories comprise the second category. They emphasize ac-
cess to rights and typically promote free-market solutions4 or quasi-mar-
ket-based approaches such as ex ante choices and advance contracting
for health plans with specific rationing protocols. 5 The third group in-
cludes theories that adhere to principles and practices that have evolved
through community traditions and therefore vary in different localities. 6
I Jon Gabel et al., Health Benefits in 2003: Premiums Reach Thirteen-Year High as
Employers Adopt New Forms of Cost-Sharing, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 117, 117-
119.
2 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempted
plaintiffs' causes of action against their HMOs).
3 Alan M. Garber & Charles E. Phelps, Economic Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 1-13 (1997); Milton C. Weinstein & William B. Stason,
Foundations of Cost Effectiveness Analysis for Health and Medical Practices, 296 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 716, 716-21 (1977) [hereinafter Medical Practices].
4 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) [hereinafter ANARCHY];
Loren E. Lomasky, Medical Progress and National Health Care, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65, 86-
88 (1981) [hereinafter Medical Progress] (arguing for a medical marketplace where consumers
can purchase health care); H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATION OF BioETHIcs 336-69
(2d ed. 1996); Charles Fried, Equality and Rights in Medical Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
Feb. 1976, at 29, 29-34 (asserting that there is no right to equal access to health care) [herein-
after Equality and Rights].
5 CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRU-
MENTrS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE CHOICES]. See generally MARK
HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RA-
TIONING MECHANISMS (1997) [hereinafter RATIONING MECHANISMS]; PAUL T. MENZEL,
STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990) 3-21, 97-115, 116-31,
199-201 [hereinafter STRONG MEDICINE].
6 See generally LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) [hereinafter
LIBERALISM]; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) [hereinafter
LIMrrs OF JUSTICE]; Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18(1) POLIT-
2006]
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The fourth offers procedural or democratic approaches, 7 some of which
"retreat to procedural justice"8 to characterize the right procedures or use
open-ended or random processes to prioritize health care.9 Finally, egali-
tarian theories that stress equal access to certain goods.' 0 These theories
have begun to form a collection of approaches to health ethics, policy
and law, each having advantages and limitations when applied to the
problems health-care systems face.
In this Article I offer an alternative theoretical framework for health
ethics, policy and law, integrating both substantive criteria and procedu-
ral mechanisms - a joint scientific and deliberative approach - to guide
health-system reform and allocation of scarce health resources. It ap-
peals to a particular vision of the good life rooted in the capability ap-
proach 1' and Aristotelian political philosophy.12 I build on and integrate
these perspectives to develop a theoretical framework of health ethics,
policy and law, and to elucidate public policy implications of such a
theory. On this view, the ethical principle of "human flourishing"1 3 un-
ICAL THEORY 6-23 (1990) [hereinafter Communitarian Critique]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) [hereinafter WHOSE JUSTICE].
7 Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Ap-
proach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (1992) [hereinafter Health Care Rationing]; Norman
Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge, HASTINGS CENTER REP. July-Aug.
1994, at 27, 27-29 [hereinafter A Challenge].
8 NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN TO
SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2002) [hereinafter SErrING LIMITS FAIRLY].
9 David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 271 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 308, 308-14 (1994) [hereinafter Disabilities Act]; John M. Taurek, Should the
Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. ArT. 293, 314-316 (1977) [hereinafter Numbers].
10 Robert M. Veatch, What is 'Just' Health Care Delivery, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS (Thomas L. Beauchamp & Le Roy Walters eds., 1978) [hereinafter ISSUES IN
BIoETHICS]; Gerald A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities, in THE
QUALITY OF LIFE 9, 28 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya K. Sen eds., 1993) [hereinafter Equality
of What]; ERIC RAKOwSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 304-05 (1991) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE]; Rich-
ard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUDmS 77-93 (1989)
[hereinafter Equal Opportunity].
I 1 Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen provide different versions of the capability ap-
proach, this Article draws on both perspectives, although more heavily on Sen in developing
theory. See generally AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) [hereinafter INE-
QUALITY]; AMARTYA K. SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999) [hereinafter COMMODI-
TIES]. For more on the differences between Nussbaum's and Sen's versions of the capability
approach see generally, Martha Nussbaum, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000).
12 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terrence Irwin trans., 1999) [hereinafter
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans., 1984) [hereinafter THE
POLITICS]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Dis-
tribution, in ARISTOTLE'S POLITIK 152 (Herausgegeben von Guinther Patzig ed., 1990) [herein-
after Political Distribution]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In
Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20(2) POL. THEORY 202 (1992) [hereinafter Human
Functioning]; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom, in ETH-
ICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 312 (David A.
Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998) [hereinafter Good As Discipline].
13 See generally Political Distribution, supra note 12; THE POLrnCS, supra note 12.
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derlies society's obligation to maintain and improve health. This princi-
ple holds that society should enable human beings to live flourishing
lives. 14 Flourishing and health are inherent to the human condition. Cer-
tain aspects of health, in particular, maintain other aspects of human
flourishing. Because without life itself, no other human functionings, in-
cluding "agency," are possible. Therefore, public policy should focus on
individuals' ability to function, and health policy should aim to support
individuals' capability for health functioning by enabling individuals to
meet health needs and by creating conditions for health agency. 15
The capability approach purports that expanding freedom is both the
primary end and principle means of public policy; consequently, public
policy should focus on removing barriers to freedom that leave people
with little choice or opportunity to exercise their reasoned agency. Free-
dom entails both processes of action and decision and actual opportuni-
ties available to people, given their personal and social circumstances. 16
In what follows, I will argue that both the process and opportunity as-
pects of freedom are essential to developing a just health care system.
Public policy should also be efficient, requiring the "wasteless, produc-
tive promotion of objectives."' 17 The primary goal for health systems, this
Article argues, is the reduction in disparities in health capabilities using
the fewest resources. Therefore, some limits must be set in allocating
resources, and individuals and experts must decide how to make these
trade-offs.
This theoretical framework offers several key principles for health
ethics, policy and law.
First, this theory is rooted in a particular view of the good life:
human flourishing, which values health intrinsically and more highly
than non-intrinsic or solely instrumental social goods, such as income.
This view gives special moral importance to what I have called health
capability. Health capability constitutes a person's ability to be healthy;
it includes health functioning and health agency.' 8 It also suggests that
certain aspects of health are prerequisites for other types of functioning,
including one's agency, or the ability to lead a life one has reason to
value. This view contrasts with the equality of opportunity view that
14 See generally Political Distribution, supra note 12; THE POLITICS, supra note 12.
15 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Aristotelian Justice and Health Policy: Capability and Incom-
pletely Theorized Agreements (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on
file with the Harvard University Library) [hereinafter ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE]; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Health and Social Justice, 364 LANCET 1075 [hereinafter Social Justice]; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Lecture entitled Social Justice and Health Policy (Health Policy Doctoral Seminar
Series, Harvard University) (1997) [hereinafter Justice and Health Policy].
16 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 17 (1999) [hereinafter FREEDOM].
17 INEQUALITY, supra note 11, at 140.
18 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Social Justice, supra note 15; Justice and
Health Policy, supra note 15.
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health care is "special because of its impact on opportunity,"' 19 and the
utilitarian view that health care is important for maximizing social wel-
fare. These distinctions arise from the different ends of justice these the-
ories espouse. Capability describes what individuals are able to do and
be, offering a realistic sense of their real freedom to pursue the lives they
have reason to value. In contrast, equality of opportunity results from
"[a] time or condition [favorable] for a particular action or aim,"'20 as
when individuals have equal access to employment opportunities, 2' and
utility encompasses desire or pleasure.
Second, this theory argues for valuing "basic" or "central" health
capabilities above those that are secondary. The former include: (a) the
capability to avoid premature death, and (b) the capability to avoid es-
capable morbidity. Agreement on the importance of providing such core
health capabilities offers guidance in prioritizing health services. 22 This
approach can help determine whether a particular medical intervention or
technology merits societal resources.
Third, this paradigm sketches a joint scientific and deliberative ap-
proach to judge the value of a health care intervention. It employs a
public scientific process that combines the evidence base of medicine
and public health with the expert opinions of physicians and public
health experts with input from individuals. Ideally, physicians and public
health experts and individuals would have authority in substantive delib-
erations about allocation decisions. This is because health policy affects
individuals directly and physicians, by virtue of their medical expertise
and allegiance to the Hippocratic oath, can and must act in their patients'
best interest. Thus, this view argues for supporting individuals' health
agency as well as their health. 23 At the policy level, democratically de-
rived public policy for "human flourishing and evaluating interventions
aimed at improving human functioning must depend on "reasoned con-
sensus."'24 Individuals are "active agents of change, rather than ... pas-
sive recipients of dispensed benefits,' 25 and thus, are essential in
19 Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIoETHICS 2, 2-16 n. 2
(2001) at 2 [hereinafter Health, and Healthcare]. See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST
HEALTH CARE 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter JUST HEALTH CARE].
20 THE NEW SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, VOL. 2
N-Z, 2009 (Lesley Brown ed., 4th ed. 1993).
21 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65-67, 83-84 (1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF
JUSTICE]
22 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Social Justice, supra note 15; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized Agree-
ments 18 Yale J. Law & Human. 273 (2006) [hereinafter Right to Health].
23 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Social Justice, supra note 15; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Rethinking Equal Access: Agency, Quality and Norms, 2 J. GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH, (in
press). [hereinafter Agency and Quality].
24 See FREEDOM, supra note 16, at 78.
25 FREEDOM, supra note 16, at xiii.
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determining social choice. Individuals must therefore have the capability
to participate in such deliberations and decision-making and know the
risks, benefits and costs of health prevention and treatment and various
health policy options.
Fourth, under this paradigm, decisions are made by appealing to a
shared concept of capability for health functioning and, when disagree-
ments occur, practical models of agreement or consensus facilitate work-
able solutions. The resolutions that flow from these deliberations offer
guidance in standardizing prevention and treatment decisions and devel-
oping health policies and health laws. 26
This view contrasts with paradigms in which consumers alone, phy-
sicians or public health experts alone, strict algorithms or cost-benefit
calculations, shared decision making within an informed consent model,
fair procedures, or third parties, such as insurers, make health care deci-
sions.27 While it endorses many of the principles of the shared decision
making approach to individual medical treatment decisions, it focuses
differently on what I call shared health governance, a paradigm in which
individuals, providers, and institutions work together to empower indi-
viduals and create an enabling environment for all to be healthy.28
Shared decision making, by contrast, focuses on individual decisions in
isolation, as opposed to a shared health governance model which incor-
porates individuals' decisions for themselves and for their society at
large. This approach also differs from efforts to develop a decision-mak-
ing process "to set fair limits to health care."129 The paradigm offered
here promotes consensus on substantive principles and procedures of dis-
tribution; offers a method for achieving that consensus (incompletely
theorized agreements or ITAs);30 places importance on the results of
health policies and laws (costs and effectiveness) in judging them; and
promotes deliberation through collaborative problem solving. Thus, the
framework integrates both consequential (substantive) and procedural
(democratic) elements of justice and it focuses on both health functioning
and on health agency. Both decision making processes and achieved out-
comes are important for evaluating justice. Procedural rules alone are
inadequate for justice, due to the need to account for the consequences of
26 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15, Right to Health, supra note 22.
27 See RATIONING MECHANISMS, supra note 5, at 8-11.
28 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Social Justice, supra note 15; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Ethics and Governance of Global Health Inequalities, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMU-
NrrY HEALTH, (in press 2006) [hereinafter Ethics and Governance].
29 SET1ING LIMITS FAIRLY, supra note 8 at 2.
30 See generally ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Social Justice, supra notel5;
Justice and Health Policy supra note 15; Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Health Care, and In-
completely Theorized Agreements, (mimeographed, Harvard University) (1995) [hereinafter
Theorized Agreements].
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such entitlements. Consequences alone are inadequate for justice, due to
the need to include individuals in decisions that affect them. Since these
recommendations form the basis for defining a universal benefits pack-
age, making allocation decisions, and constructing guidelines, the collec-
tive reasoning should be made public.
Shared health governance extends beyond the individual patient-
doctor relationship to the institutions that oversee the health sector. For
example, patients must be protected from physicians who have financial
incentives to provide inappropriate and costly care, or who unfairly deny,
or fail to recommend, appropriate medical care; or who practice bedside
rationing. In the former case, peer review should motivate physicians to
conform to established standards. In the latter, appeals procedures
should protect individuals from unfair denial of care. An independent
and impartial governing board should periodically review coverage and
quality decisions, hear and rule on patient and physician appeals, and
require guidelines to be adjusted. The board should also oversee and
critically review quality of care and other information, including physi-
cian credentials and abilities. Many states currently have consumer
grievance and appeal procedures, while Medicare has a federal external
review system.
This shared health governance model in health ethics, policy and
law can potentially improve individuals' health and health agency and
decrease costs. Researchers have found, for example, that patients
knowledgeable about treatment risks and benefits might actually choose
treatment less often than those who spoke only briefly to their physicians
about the procedure; in one case, 30% fewer patients chose surgery for
severe back pain caused by a ruptured disc. 31 Ensuring individuals'
health agency for health care decision making depends critically on pro-
viding patients with the most up-to-date information on possible risks
and benefits and providing them the circumstances under which they
have the freedom to make such decisions.
Fifth, a shared health governance model takes a different tack on the
issue of equal access. 32 First, equal access should mean equal access to
high-quality care, not a "decent minimum," "adequate care," or "tiered
health care." Second, it is not enough to provide health care without
efforts to expand individuals' health agency - their ability to engage with
and navigate the health care system to prevent mortality and morbidity
31 See Richard A. Deyo et al., Involving Patients in Clinical Decisions: Impact of An
Interactive Video Program on Use of Back Surgery, 38 MEDICAL CARE 959, 965 n. 9 (2000)
(discussing a study in which patients who had received videodisk information about herniated
disks were less likely to undergo back surgery than those who had only received a booklet).
32 Agency and Quality, supra note 23.
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and to meet health needs. 33 Third, shared health governance means
shared responsibility - that individuals, providers, and institutions have
respective roles and responsibilities in achieving health goals. A major
emphasis of this theory is that institutions and providers are morally obli-
gated to provide high quality health care to all individuals. 34 While a
focus on high quality in this paradigm intersects with recent US policy to
improve health care quality, the primary motivation espoused here is one
of ensuring fairness: that it is unfair to deny any one, or group of individ-
uals, access to quality care if doing so could substantially decrease their
chance of a significantly improved health outcome. In policy terms,
reaching this goal would require continuous efforts to standardize
medicine, reduce medical errors, and move toward a gold standard of
care.35 High-quality care is necessary from a moral point of view for
helping people to function best, given their circumstances and for maxi-
mal capacity for functioning. Such a view would not condone the signifi-
cant disparities in health care quality that exist in the U.S. and in many
developing countries, for example. Moreover, universal health insurance
that is community-rated and progressively financed is critical because
equal access cannot be separated from equity in health-care financing. 36
Medical appropriateness and medical necessity and not ability to pay
must determine resource allocation.
Sixth, evaluation of health policies, laws, and technologies must
consider costs because we live in a world of scarce resources. Moreover,
every resource has an alternative use, so its expenditure corresponds with
an opportunity cost. Therefore, some limits are necessary and individuals
and society, through shared health governance, must use these resources
parsimoniously by evaluating efficiency. Efficiency measures espoused
here include cost-minimization analysis and economic incentives for
high-quality care. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) can also aid in
comparing interventions for a single population, such as AIDS patients,
by weighing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of two alternate
interventions. For example, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of combi-
nation antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection,37 or of preventing AIDS-
33 Social Justice, supra note 15; Agency and Quality, supra note 23.
34 Agency and Quality, supra note 23.
35 See COMMITTEE ON THE QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE IN AMERICA, INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001).
36 See EQUITY IN THE FINANCE AND DELIVERY OF HEALTHCARE: AN INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVE (Eddie Van Doorslaer et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE];
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Catastrophic Health Expenditure, 362 LANCET 996, 997 (2003) [herein-
after Catastrophic Health] (discussing the importance of health insurance).
37 See Kenneth A. Freedberg, et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Combination Antire-
troviral Therapy for HIV Disease, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 824 n. 11 (2001).
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related opportunistic infections, 38 or simulation modeling of lifetime
costs and life expectancy to inform clinical guidelines for the treatment
of HIV-related Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)39 can help iden-
tify the additional costs society must pay for the additional benefits of
each intervention.
The consideration of costs under this theory resembles a utilitarian
welfare economic perspective in that costs and outcomes are both valued.
However, it contrasts with the utilitarian aggregation methodology and
recommends the use of cost-minimization analysis (CMA) and cost-ef-
fectiveness analysis (CEA) in combination with equity-oriented alloca-
tions (as opposed to incorporating equity weights into CEA.) It takes a
step-wise approach to resource allocation whereby economic considera-
tions follow and complement clinical input, not vice versa. In addition to
helping physicians and patients judge whether a particular medical inter-
vention or technology merits investment, CMA and CEA can reveal fi-
nancial reasons for basic health care inequalities. For example, some
American oncologists profit by purchasing chemotherapy agents and dis-
pensing them at a much higher price, which leads to inefficiency through
higher pricing and over-use, particularly at the end of life.40 This prac-
tice also compromises a physician's duty to act in a patient's best
interest.
This paradigm also differs from efforts to assign measures and
weights to individuals' disabilities, health conditions or efforts41 in order
to specify how much weight to give to severely disabled individuals.
The view espoused here does not move in that direction, but suggests
that it is more useful to base these types of judgments on joint patient-
physician decision making (at the policy and individual levels) on medi-
cal necessity, medical appropriateness, and medical futility (as defined
by individuals' agency), rather than attempting to estimate specific
weights for severely disabled individuals. Thus, this framework aims to
provide guidance on protecting disabled people from discrimination
while limiting exorbitantly costly care that would deprive others of
health resources. Moreover, a general principle of "reasonable accom-
38 See Kenneth A. Freedberg, et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Preventing AIDS-Related
Opportunistic Infections, 279 JAMA 130, 130-136 n. 2 (1998).
39 See Sue Goldie et al., Prophylaxis for Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Related
Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia: Using Simulation Modeling to Inform Clinical Guidelines,
162 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 921 n. 8 (2002).
40 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Chemotherapy Use Among Medicare Beneficiaries at
the End of Life, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 639, 639-643 n. 8 (2003) (discussing a study that
showed chemotherapy was used frequently in the last three months of life by patients who died
of cancer).
41 Erik Nord et al., Incorporating Societal Concerns for Fairness in Numerical Valua-
tions of Health Programmes, 8 HEALTH ECON. 25, 25-39 (1999) [hereinafter HEALTH
ECONOMICS].
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modation" could help identify reasonable adjustments and constraints be-
cause this paradigm argues for proportional prioritization; allocating
resource proportional to health needs, but recognizes that reasonable lim-
its should apply.
By arguing for an alternative paradigm of health ethics, policy and
law with roots in Aristotle's political philosophy and Amartya Sen's ca-
pability approach, this Article undoubtedly raises more questions than it
answers. An ongoing debate that develops the more practical implica-
tions of this theory will evolve in the future. And although the Article
often highlights the differences between this view and other approaches,
it also acknowledges their many common features. As one ethicist has
noted, the "family of views of justice"42 will more likely converge rather
than diverge as the field progresses.
I. HEALTH ETHICS, POLICY AND LAW: THE CURRENT SET
OF FRAMEWORKS
Inequality in access to health insurance and health care, exacerbated
by cost constraints, has spawned many frameworks of health ethics, pol-
icy and law. These fall into a number of categories, including: (1) wel-
fare economic and utilitarian schemes that rely on cost-effectiveness,
cost-utility, or cost-benefit analyses to aggregate costs and benefits and
maximize overall social welfare; (2) theories that adhere to principles
developed through community traditions; (3) egalitarian perspectives that
focus on equal opportunity, equal welfare, and equal resources; (4) liber-
tarian theories that emphasize individual rights and typically promote
free-market solutions or quasi-market approaches such as ex ante choices
and advance contracting; and (5) procedural or democratic approaches,
which characterize the right procedures or random processes to prioritize
care. This section discusses some of the advantages and shortcomings of
several of these frameworks, and concludes that there is significant op-
portunity for an alternative paradigm.
A. WELFARE ECONOMIC AND UTILITARIAN APPROACHES
One of the leading frameworks for health ethics, policy and law is
utilitarianism, which arguably serves as the standard framework for
health policy analysis43 and was endorsed by the Panel on Cost-Effec-
tiveness in Health and Medicine. The United States Public Health Ser-
vice created the panel in 1993 to review the state of the field and develop
42 See generally Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19.
43 Milton C. Weinstein, Principles of Cost-Effective Resource Allocation in Health Care
Organizations, 6(1), INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH
CARE, 93-103 (1990) at 93-94 (applying cost-effectiveness analysis from the viewpoint of a
national health care system); See Medical Practices, supra note 3, at 716-21.
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guidelines for standardizing cost-effectiveness analyses in health and
medicine.44 It was comprised of thirteen nonfederal scientists and schol-
ars with experience in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), medical ethics,
health law, and health outcomes measurement. 4 5 The panel recom-
mended a system that captures individual preferences for different states
of health, and recommended Quality-Adjusted-Life-Years (QALYs) as
the metric for ranking health interventions. 46
Utilitarian frameworks require allocations that maximize social util-
ity. However, rights have an "indefinite and tenuous foundation" 4 7 be-
cause they rely upon overall utility maximization. Thus, only improved
net social utility would justify a right to health care.4 8 Cost-utility analy-
sis (CUA) is the primary method for evaluating health policy under a
utilitarian ethic. CUA values health status in terms of health preferences,
desires, or utilities; the QALY index combines preferences for length of
life with those for quality of life. Like most utility measures, QALYs are
based on the premise that utilities of different individuals and health con-
ditions can compare on a single quantitative scale.
Other welfare economic techniques use different outcome metrics
and include CEA and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as well as CUA. CBA
translates all benefits into monetary units through various techniques
such as Cost of Illness (COI) studies, which value health outcomes by
direct (medical and non-medical expenses) and indirect (lost productivity
costs measures) costing methods. 49 Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) and Will-
ingness-to-Accept (WTA) methodologies use questionnaires to assess in-
dividuals' willingness to pay for risk reduction or accept additional
risk.50 CBA analysts also assess individuals' preferences for changes in
44 See REPORT TO THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE BY THE PANEL ON COST-EFFECTIVE-
NESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 13 (Marthe
R. Gold et al., eds., 1996) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT] (endorsing cost-effectiveness analy-
sis as crucial in decision making, but not as the sole decision making procedure).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
335 (1994) [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS].
48 See Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHuLoso-
PHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 55-78 (1984) [hereinafter Minimum of Health Care]; ("Thus Utilitari-
anism may require that, even for the most basic services, what is guaranteed for one individual
may not be available to another, even though their needs are equal and both would benefit
greatly from the service.").
49 See DOROTHY P. RICE & ELLEN J. MACKENZIE, COST OF INJURY IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 70 (1989) (measuring the economic burden on society of
injury-related illness and premature death).
50 See VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 6, 24, 74 (George Tol-
ley et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ECONOMIC APPROACH]. See also EzRA J. MISHAN, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 162 (1976) (arguing that when more "objective" sources of information do
not exist, questionnaires are an important way to measure costs and benefits).
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risk, based on their purchasing decisions; 5' and they ask people to assign
a monetary value to various health states and associated risks, using Con-
tingent Valuation (CV) surveys. 52
The various welfare economic techniques are not without their
weaknesses, however. One common concern about CBA is that respon-
dents' income levels skew monetary valuations. Critics have faulted
COI for not including pain and suffering in its calculations. WTA and
WTP have raised objections because extrapolations from market transac-
tions and individuals' hypothetical assessments might not accurately re-
flect individuals' valuations of health benefits and risks. Risk and
survival are difficult to quantify. Moreover, the cost-per-QALY method-
ology also does not recognize that health care evaluation must assess
both the severity of a patient's initial state and the effect of treatment. 53
To account for the tradeoff between severity and treatment effect, Nord
proposes a mathematical model and index (cost per SAVE).54 However,
these methods of health valuation yield widely disparate estimates of the
"value of life," and it is unclear which method best applies the principles
of welfare economics.
The application of welfare economic and utilitarian principles to
health ethics, policy and law raises several concerns. First, accounting
for only aggregate welfare without considering the distribution of bene-
fits and burdens in society is problematic. CUA, CBA, and CEA tolerate
significant inequalities in order to increase total or average social utility.
In response to this concern, there have been attempts to incorporate a
distributional ethic into the utilitarian approach. 55 Kantian and liberta-
rian ethicists, however, would be concerned about the attempt to aggre-
gate across persons. Such an attempt conflicts with the principle that
each individual is an end in herself and cannot be used instrumentally to
assist other individuals. 56
51 See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK (1992).
52 See Id. at 50.
53 See Erik Nord, The Trade-Off Between Severity of Illness and Treatment Effect in
Cost-Value Analysis of Health Care, 24 HEALTH POLICY 227 (1993).
54 Id.
55 See generally HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 41(arguing for "cost-value analysis"
utilizing equity weights as an approach that supplements utilitarian analysis with distributive
concerns).
56 See ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 228 ("People will differ in how they view regarding
natural talents as a common asset. [A]nd they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant
that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate."); THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 521-522 (describing the concept of private society, in which individ-
uals or associations make individualized assessments of social arrangements as means to their
own private aims, which are "either competing or independent, but not in any case complimen-
tary."[sic]); Christine Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack of the Distinction
Between Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Values, 10 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'y 24-51 (1993)
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The Oregon Medicaid experiment illustrates the problems that can
result from strict application of utilitarianism and cost-utility analysis.
The experiment's algorithm counterintuitively ranked tooth-capping
ahead of surgery for ectopic pregnancy. 57 This "aggregation problem"
results from weighing a small benefit for many individuals against a
large benefit for a few.58 Moreover, strict CUA discriminates against
disabled people by assigning less weight to their health benefits than to
those of non-disabled individuals. 59 This strategy relates to the "priorities
problem" in health-care rationing, or determining how much weight to
give to society's most needy members. 60
Using utility measures to the exclusion of other measures also raises
concerns. Sen has identified three main limitations of the utilitarian
framework: (1) it omits freedom and focuses on achievements; (2) it
omits certain achievements that are not reflected in the utility measure;
and (3) it fails to measure accurately situations of persistent deprivation
and adversity, in which people with significantly reduced functioning
may not appear to be so deprived because they have adapted to their
adverse environment.6'
Entrenched inequalities highlight the difficulty of comparing inter-
personal utility and comparing different utilities on a single quantitative
scale. Commensurate measures of utility cannot assess well-being in
functional terms. It is also difficult to compare diverse health conditions.
For example, individuals associate completely different health values
with the conditions of infertility, HIV/AIDS, and hearing loss. In addi-
tion, CEA, CBA, and CUA assume that saving life and extending life are
commensurable with changes in health status or quality of life. For ex-
ample, Hadorn discusses the "Rule of Rescue" and the symbolic value of
saving "identifiable lives," noting the need to incorporate this altruistic
value into any health-related assessment.62 Hadorn argues for guidelines
that would balance quality-of-life-based benefits with the value of saving
(disagreeing with the proposition that "the value of persons [is] a metaphysical reality... [that
suggests] that people are a good thing, and therefore that many people are better than a
few")[hereinafter We Can Share].
57 Dan W. Brock, Justice and the ADA: Does Prioritizing and Rationing Healthcare
Discriminate Against the Disabled?, 12(2) SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'Y 159, 161 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Prioritizing and Rationing]; David C. Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon.
Cost-effectiveness Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991) [hereinafter Care
Priorities].
58 See A Challenge, supra note 7, at 28.
59 See Brock, Prioritizing and Rationing, supra note 57, at 173.
60 See Norman Daniels, Rationing Medical Care: A Philosopher's Perspective on Out-
comes and Process, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 27, 37 (1998) [hereinafter Rationing Medical Care].
61 AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 49 (John M. Letiche ed., 1987). See also
SEN ET AL., THE STANDARD OF LIVING (Geoffrey Hawthorne ed., 1987).
62 Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2221-22; See ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 50,
at 23-41.
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identifiable lives. 63 However, life-saving interventions have drawbacks
when expensive technology keeps people alive temporarily, or even for
extended periods of time, 64 regardless of the resulting quality of life.
The challenge, then, is to respect the unique value of saving lives while
recognizing the need to assess treatment efficacy.
Other critics of CUA argue that QALYs disfavor individuals with a
diminished capacity to benefit, 65 older individuals with fewer years to
live,66 and, as noted above, people with disabilities. 67 Still, many defend
the maximization principle behind CEA68 and the ex ante rationale that
accepts tradeoffs. 69 Some argue that cost-value analysis, which incorpo-
rates social values, should replace CUA altogether. 70 Cost-value analy-
sis proponents propose that the public's preference for interpersonal
tradeoffs should guide resource allocation rather than an aggregation of
individuals' preferences for health states. 71 Indeed, empirical research
reveals that most people favor a system of resource allocation that priori-
tizes severely ill individuals, even if their capacity to benefit is limited
and the cost of treating them is relatively high. 72 From this perspective,
CUA elicits the wrong type of preferences when it prioritizes individual
preferences for health states. There are, however, critics of the cost-
63 See Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2223-24.
64 See generally SCHIAvO EX REL. SCHINDLER V. SCHIAVo, 403 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir.
2005).
65 See Madison Powers & Ruth Faden, Inequalities in Health, Inequalities in Health
Care: Four Generations of Discussion About Justice Cost-Effectiveness, 10 KENNEDY INST. OF
ETHICS J. 109, 113 (2000) [hereinafter Inequalities in Health].
66 See JOHN R. HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE ANALYSIS 89-90 (1985).
67 See Inequalities in Health,, supra note 65, at 113.
68 See David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From Theory to Practice Cost-Effec-
tiveness Analysis: A Conversation With My Father, 267 J. OF THE AM. MED. Ass'N 1669, 1675
n. 12 (1992) ("We who do cost-effectiveness analyses aren't coldhearted accountants who take
pleasure in depriving people of health care.... We think that we are responding to a national
call for help.")
69 Madison Powers, Hypothetical Choice Approaches to Health Care Allocation, in AL-
LOCATING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 147, 159 (James Humber & Robert Almeder eds., 1995)
(outlining the "ex ante Pareto approach" espoused by the Comparative Benefits Modeling
Project).
70 See ERIK NORD, COST-VALUE ANALYSIS tN HEALTHCARE: MAKING SENSE OUT OF
QALY's 123-27 (Douglas Maclean, ed., Cambridge University Press) (1999) [hereinafter
COST-VALUE ANALYSIS] ("Such a model could formally be identical to the conventional
QALY model. But its basic measurement concept would be societal value rather than individ-
ual utility.").
71 See id. at 115-18 ("What ultimately is needed in resource allocation decisions is not
utilities for health states per se, but rather societal values for different health improvements
relative to each other."); Paul Menzel, How Should What Economists Call "Social Values" Be
Measured?, 3 J. OF ETHICS 249, 251-59 (1999) [hereinafter Social Values] ("CEA needs to
incorporate a broader set of values-social or societal values-than the individual utilities
incorporated by the conventional ... form of CEA.")
72 See COST-VALUE ANALYSIS, supra note 70, at 30-37 (reviewing a range of studies in
which respondents placed more value on severity of injury than on utility maximization).
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value paradigm who question whether so-called societal preferences ac-
tually represent the majority view. 73 They wonder how one can know
whether such judgments are "sufficiently reflective or sufficiently in-
formed"74 and how to reflect political and moral disagreement about so-
cial values in a public and transparent manner. Critics also argue that the
cost-value paradigm fails to account for the significance of a patient's
history and life circumstances.75
The Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) approach attempts to
address some of these concerns. It advocates a process for establishing
group preferences, on disability weights, which are aggregated, using
DALYs, to measure the health of different population groups.76 While
the effort is laudable, concerns remain regarding the use of such data for
policy purposes due to the bias towards the able-bodied over disabled
persons77 and the limited ability to incorporate additional moral criteria
into decision-making. 78
B. COMMUNITARIANISM AND LIBERAL COMMUNITARIANISM
Communitarian theories of justice argue that the provision of health
care is an expression of community values, and therefore, the justifica-
tion for health care varies by community. 79 Under communitarian the-
ory, each society constructs its own principles as it evolves politically;
morality is a cultural rather than abstract concept.80 Taken to the ex-
treme, this viewpoint could threaten the sense of common humanity that
is a basis for morality, and it could also undermine political and social
cooperation in societies that respect individual liberties and diversity. 8'
73 See Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 118.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 118-19.
76 See generally Christopher Murray & Arnab Acharya, Understanding DALYs, 16 J.
HEALTH ECON. 703 (1997) ("We do not take into account health satisfaction of individuals at
all; the task is to isolate health conditions and limit the relevant non-health contingences to
determine the impact of health conditions on individuals.").
77 See Sudhir Anand & Kara Hanson, Disability-Adjusted Life Years: A Critical Review,
16 J. HEALTH ECON. 685, 701-02 (1997).
78 See Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 120-21.
79 See generally Welfare, Membership and Need, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS
(Michael A. Sandel, ed., 1984), supra note 6. See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:
A STUDY N MORAL THEORY (Am. ed., 1981); LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6; WHOSE JUS-
TICE, supra note 6; Communitarian Critique, supra note 6.
80 See generally Communitarian Critique, supra note 6.
81 See ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 378
(2000) [hereinafter FROM CHANCE] (arguing for a liberal moral theory that addressed princi-
ples as well as virtues, acknowledging that "reliance on the judgment of virtuous individuals
... is no substitute for principled public debate about the ethical character of our common
institutions").
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Ezekiel Emanuel proposes a communitarian approach that incorpo-
rates aspects of libertarianism. 82 In an ideal system, he proposes, delib-
erative, democratic communities could develop shared conceptions of
justice and the good life. 83 However, Emanuel is critical of noncom-
munitarian democratic political procedures, arguing that it is difficult to
agree on a substantive conception of distributive justice in a liberal pol-
ity. 84 He would also designate the current level of federal health spend-
ing as the national health care budget and give patients vouchers so they
could choose among community health programs (CHPs) offering differ-
ent levels of resources. 85 He rejects cost-benefit, cost-utility, or cost-
effectiveness methodologies because they bypass the need for collective
reflection on values. 86 His proposal has been criticized on impracticality
and moral grounds because CHPs might be tempted to select benefit
structures that favor some citizens over others. 87
C. EGALITARIAN THEORIES: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EQUAL
WELFARE
Egalitarian theories, a third framework, focus on the equal distribu-
tion of certain societal goods, one of which is health care. They do not
support "equal sharing of all possible social benefits." 88 The most note-
worthy egalitarian theory of justice is John Rawls's view that justice re-
quires the fair distribution of "primary goods."'89 According to Rawls,
rational agents behind a "veil of ignorance" 90 about their personal cir-
cumstances would choose principles of justice that maximize the mini-
mum level of primary goods. While Rawls did not directly apply his
theory to health care, 91 others have done so.
82 See EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL
POLrrY (1991) at 135 [hereinafter HUMAN LIFE].
83 Id. at 156-57.
84 See id. at 149-50.
85 Id. at 184-87.
86 See id. at 156 (rejecting utilitarianism as a framework in which to analyze medical
ethics issues).
87 See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47.
88 Id. at 339.
89 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 62 ("As a first step, suppose that the basic
structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is
presumed to want.").
90 Id. at 12. ("The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This en-
sures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.").
91 He did include health care in later works. See John Rawls, THE LAW OF PEOPLES
(1997).
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Those who have analyzed Rawls's approach in the context of health
care, particularly Rakowski, have concluded that hypothetical choosers
would prioritize resources randomly. 92
Norman Daniels and colleagues also apply Rawls's theory of justice
to health care and argue that health care is a right because it provides
"equality of opportunity; '93 the Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) ac-
count. Gerald Cohen has also drawn on Rawls's theory and expanded
the Rawlsian view through an "equal opportunity for welfare or advan-
tage" approach which supports rights for those disadvantaged by poor
talents and skills as well as by disease or disability.94 Daniels9 5 counters
that this interpretation places too little emphasis on choice or responsibil-
ity and raises problems for public policy 96 including access to interven-
tions that go beyond ameliorating disease. 97 He supports the "level
playing field conception of equal opportunity", 98 which requires efforts
"to eliminate or ameliorate ... social factors that limit opportunity over
and above discrimination." 99
Drawing on Rawls, Daniels adopts the "veil of ignorance" con-
cept,10 0 which suggests that individuals should attempt to formulate hy-
pothetical allocation standards for a "potential future self," without
knowledge of their current or future health status. Under these condi-
tions, people would choose allocations that would enable them to achieve
an age-relative normal opportunity range at each stage of life.10 1
The FEO account does not discriminate among the different types of
health care that society should provide its citizens under the "equality of
opportunity" principle. Moreover, this theory does not consider the
tradeoffs between health care and other social goods and adequately con-
sider the costs of health insurance, goods, and services. Moreover, Dan-
iels and others later extended the FEO approach to social determinants of
92 See generally EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 10.
93 See JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 19.
94 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 10; Gerald A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalita-
rian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 906-44 n. 4 (1989); and Equality of What, supra note 10, at 9-29.
95 Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19.
96 See generally James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining 'Medical Necessity' in
Mental Health Practice, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5-13 n. 6 (1994) (discussing the diffi-
culties in rationing mental health care)[hereinafter Medical Necessity].
97 See FROM CHANCE, supra note 81.
98 See FROM CHANCE, supra note 81 at 65. See also generally John Roemer, Equality
and Responsibility, 20 BOSTON REVIEW 3, 3-7 (1995); See also JOHN ROEMER, THEORIES OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996).
99 FROM CHANCE, supra note 81 at 16.
100 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 21.
101 See JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 19.
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health, claiming that health results largely from social conditions.10 2
Many have criticized this expansion, asserting, in particular, that the re-
duction of socio-economic inequalities might not necessarily diminish
health inequalities. 103 To solve rationing problems in the realm of health
care, Daniels and his colleagues argue for "fair procedures" that solve
rationing problems reasonably,' 0 4 although they have paid less attention
to how individuals make rationing decisions and how to evaluate the out-
comes such procedures generate.
The critiques of FEO tend to cluster around a few themes. First,
FEO relies too heavily on statistical averages, 0 5 which fluctuate with
changes in the distribution of health and disease. Second, it does not
include the alleviation of pain and suffering as a goal of health care. 10 6
Third, it appears to exclude "nonproductive" or "socially isolated" indi-
viduals. 10 7 Fourth, it fails to clarify the concept of "fair equality of op-
portunity" and its link with health care. Fifth, indeterminacy and
subjective valuation are implicit in the FEO account. A sixth area of
criticism focuses on Daniels' absence of guidance on weighing health
care against other types of resources. 0 8 A seventh points to insufficient
consideration of "hard cases," such as patients with intractable and exor-
bitantly costly disabilities, who might receive unlimited medical ser-
vices.' °9 Eighth, some critics argue that Daniels' notion of "adequate
care" is too vague to be effectively implemented. 1 0 Finally, FEO is crit-
icized as being too circuitous because the opportunity range is endoge-
102 See Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19, at 6; NORMAN DANIELS ET AL., IS INE-
QUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH? (Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers eds., Beacon Press) (2000)
[hereinafter OUR HEALTH].
103 See generally Michael Marmot, Do Inequalities Matter?, in OUR HEALTH, supra note
102, at 37-41 (arguing that flattening social hierarchies altogether may not lead to a reduction
in health inequalities).
104 See Setting Limits Fairly, supra note 8.
105 See Lawrence Stem, Opportunity and Health Care: Criticisms and Suggestions, 8 J.
MED. & PHiL. 345 (1983) [hereinafter Opportunity and Health].
106 See Sherman T. Folland, A Critique of Pure Need: An Analysis of Norman Daniels'
Concept of Health Care Need, 17 INT'L J. SociAL ECON. 40 (1990) [hereinafter Pure Need];
Opportunity and Health, supra note 108, at 345-49; Frances Kamm, Health and Equality of
Opportunity, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17-19 (2001) [hereinafter Health and Equality].
107 See Ronald M. Green, Access to Healthcare: Going Beyond Fair Equality of Opportu-
nity, 1 Am. J. BIOETHICS 22-23 (2001) [hereinafter Access to Healthcare]; See Health and
Equality, supra note 106. Both articles challenge a Rawlsian understanding of FEO and argue
that Daniels' notion of species-typical normal functioning is a vague concept that may not
justify the right of beneficial healthcare to nonproductive or socially isolated individuals.
108 See Arti K. Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1023-24 (1997) [hereinafter Rationing Through Choice].
109 See HUMAN LIE, supra note 82, at 135.
110 See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449-544 (1994)
[hereinafter Allocating Health]; HUMAN LIE, supra note 82; and Rationing Through Choice,
supra note 108.
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nous to the process of determining social investments in health care and
other sectors. 11
Responding to these concerns, Daniels acknowledges that both his
approach and those of his critics fail to meet many of these challenges.
He identifies four unsolved rationing problems: (i) the fair chances/best
outcomes problem (how to balance best outcomes with chances for a
given benefit); (ii) the priorities problem (how much priority to give to
the most disadvantaged; (iii) the aggregation problem (how to weigh
small benefits for many against large benefits for a few); and (iv) the
democracy problem (when to use fair processes that rank democratic
preferences over substantive principles).1 12 Later, Daniels also concedes
that his approach does not provide assistance in choosing which opportu-
nities to protect when it is impossible to protect every opportunity. 113
A number of scholars have worked on these issues.1 14 Kamm, for
example, has studied the aggregation and priorities problems, using hy-
pothetical case studies to develop agreement on mid-level principles. 115
Daniels believes that, even with this method, broad moral disagreements
will prevent consensus on principles.1 16 Nord has proposed an empirical
approach based on person-tradeoff questions in order to reveal moral
principles in a given population. 1 7 Others have argued for random allo-
cation of health care to those with equal "capacity to benefit."' 1 8 Despite
these laudable efforts, Daniels notes that broad moral disagreements will
prevent consensus on principles, and we must retreat to a process upon
111 See Minimum of Health Care, supra note 48 at 60; Pure Need, supra note 106.
112 See A Challenge, supra note 7 at 27 (acknowledging that "my 'fair equality of oppor-
tunity' account of just healthcare. . .fail[ed] to yield specific solutions to these rationing
problems," and further stating that there will unlikely be consensus about distributive justice
and rationing problems).
113 See Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19.
114 See Mary Ann Baily, The Democracy Problem, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 39-42
(1994); John Broome, Fairness Versus Doing the Most Good, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 36-
39 (1994); See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 339 (1986) [hereinafter MORALITY];
Frances Kamm, To Whom?, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29-32 (1994) [hereinafter To Whom];
Erik Nord, The Person-trade-off Approach to Valuing Health Care Programs, 15 MEDICAL
DECISION MAKING 201-208 (1995) [hereinafter Person-trade-offl; COST-VALUE ANALYSIS,
supra note 70; Eric Rakowski, The Aggregation Problem, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33-36
(1994).
115 See generally To Whom, supra note 114; Health and Equality, supra note 106.
116 See Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19, at 2, 10 (reasoning that the middle-level
principles supplement theories of distributive justice, which are highly contested).
117 See e.g., Person-trade-off, supra note 114, at 201 ("The person-trade-off technique is
a way of estimating the social values of different health care interventions."). See also CosT-
VALUE ANALYSIS, supra note 70, at 13-17, 30-31 (explaining the person-trade-off analysis of
welfare economics and discussing its potential as a guideline for decision makers).
118 Disabilities Act, supra note 9 (interpreting the Americans With Disabilities Act as a
safeguard against the discriminatory effects of rationing in health care); Numbers, supra note 9
(arguing against considering "the relative numbers of people involved as something in itself of
significance" in determining a course of action in certain tradeoff situations).
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which all can agree is a fair way to resolve disputes.1 19 Below, I review a
number of approaches that favor procedural mechanisms of justice and
democratic deliberations for resolving such disputes.
Ronald Green has applied Rawls's theory to health care differently
from the FEO account. 120 Instead of deliberative decision-making, Green
envisions an income-adjusted price system that enables consumers to es-
tablish their priorities for health care. 121 Finally, a major concern with
the Rawlsian approach is that it focuses on means (resources) rather than
ends and fails to specifically. address human diversity. 122
Some theories of justice that focus on equal welfare attempt to ad-
dress the concern with equal resource accounts. In the context of health
care, Robert Veatch advocates consideration of ends into his resource-
based distributive theory via a "capacity to benefit" principle of distribu-
tion.123 Some critics of Veatch's theory argue that the capacity to benefit
is difficult to define, both in theory and practice, 124 while others maintain
that it would be quite similar to a QALY methodology.' 25 Veatch em-
phasizes autonomy, cautioning society to "permit only certain conse-
quences to be balanced against autonomy," such as helping the
disadvantaged or promoting equality.126 Similar equal welfare accounts
employ principles of comparable opportunities 127 and argue for equal op-
portunity for welfare.
D. LIBERTARIAN AND MARKET-BASED APPROACHES
Proponents of the fourth framework argue that a market mechanism
is the ideal way to distribute health care. This approach generally stems
from an overarching libertarian philosophy 128 in which individual free-
dom and autonomy are the predominant societal values, and in which the
119 Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19, at 10.
120 See Access to Healthcare, supra note 107, with supra text accompanying notes 48-62.
121 See id. at 23 ("[A] major role should be given to the price system, which permits
citizens to establish individual priorities for healthcare services.").
122 See INEQUALITY, supra note 11.
123 See ISSUES IN BioETHics, supra note 10, at 410-417.
124 See generally JoaN F. KILNER, WHO LivEs? WHO DIs?: ETHICAL CRITERIA IN PA-
rIErr SELECTION 115-60 (1990) [hereinafter PATIENT SELECTION] (presenting the justifica-
tions for and weaknesses of considerations of medical benefits, likelihood of benefit, length of
benefit, and quality of benefit).
125 See Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1065-70 (arguing that QALY max-
imization can be reconciled with commensurability of benefits).
126 Robert M. Veatch, Which Grounds for Overriding Autonomy are Legitimate?, 26 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 42, 43 (1996) [hereinafter Overriding Autonomy].
127 See generally Equal Opportunity, supra note 10, at 85-87 ("When persons enjoy
equal opportunity for welfare in the extended sense, any actual inequality of welfare in the
positions they reach is due to factors that lie within each individual's control.").
128 See ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 167-74 (explaining how distributive justice facilitates
a shift from classical liberal self-ownership to infringement of individual rights); Medical Pro-
gress, supra note 4, at 69 ("[T]here is a wide gulf between medical care being an important
2006]
424 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:403
government's role is to protect individual rights - especially property
rights. This framework does not support a right to health care because
efforts to guarantee such a right could infringe on individual liberties, by
requiring people to pay taxes, for example. 129 Individuals are autono-
mous agents who may freely choose to purchase or forego health insur-
ance or health care. 130 Thus, a strict market-based approach would allow
the more affluent and those with strong preferences for certain goods and
services to receive more and better health care, regardless of need or
capability.
Havighurst argues for a market-oriented approach that would allow
consumers to choose among different plans according to the benefit level
they desire.' 3 ' Lomasky would give consumers the opportunity to "make
informed purchases in a genuine medical marketplace." 1 32 Whereas
strict libertarian views deny that society has a moral obligation to pro-
vide health resources to its citizens, more moderate adaptations support
some form of income transfer. Lomasky and Engelhardt, for example,
favor cash vouchers for health insurance 133 while Fried sanctions income
transfer for health care. 134 These more moderate libertarian views recog-
nize a very limited role for the state in improving welfare while main-
taining their primary focus on individual autonomy. Engelhardt, for
example, has emphasized medicine's role as a secular profession in a
pluralistic society in which people disagree on a common substantive
morality. 35 He focuses on the peaceful settling of moral differences,
with respect for personal autonomy as the utmost societal value. 136 En-
gelhardt is critical of hypothetical choice procedures, arguing that they
result in decisions that reflect a thin theory of the good based on antece-
human interest or need and its being a right."). See generally H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN BIOETHIcS (2000) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN BIoETHics].
129 See ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 170 ("[I]f it would be illegitimate for a tax system to
seize some of a man's leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, how can it be
legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's goods for that purpose?").
130 See Medical Progress, supra note 4, at 87 ("Those who place a premium on present
consumption should be free to devote only a minimal amount of income to health care
coverage.").
131 See HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 5 at 3 ("This study argues that consumer
choices are of limited consequence today precisely because all health plans must meet essen-
tially the same legal standards and requirements. If consumer choice is to serve consumers and
the economy well, competing health plans must be free to establish alternative standards and
requirements by contract.").
132 Medical Progress, supra note 4, at 88.
133 See Medical Progress, supra note 4, at 86 ("I suggest ... a cash grant or voucher
program."); See generally CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS, supra note 128.
134 See Equality and Rights, supra note 4, at 33 ("What if... each person were assured a
certain amount of money to purchase medical services as he chose?").
135 See generally CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS, supra note 128.
136 See id.
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dent choice. 37 Veatch cautions us to be selective in what we choose to
balance against autonomy. 138
More recently, market-based approaches, such as managed care,
have become more prevalent in the United States. This model attempts
to allocate health services through capitated payments to physicians, fi-
nancial incentives based on quantity, gate-keeping, and longer waiting
periods. Although managed care may lower health-care costs in certain
contexts, 139 many argue that financial incentives have put doctors in an
unethical position, 140 by encouraging them to avoid diagnostic tests, hos-
pitalizations, and expensive referrals that might benefit their patients.
Such financial incentives erode patients' trust. 4 1 There are also con-
cerns about other quasi market-based reforms, such as ex ante con-
tracting for insurance plans with rationing protocols that leave patients
insufficiently insured for interventions they might need. In the United
States, for example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA) requires emergency room personnel to treat even uninsured
or underinsured individuals in medical emergencies, including people
who would have contracted to forgo treatment for certain conditions.' 42
The unpredictable nature of many adverse health events and society's
obligation to address medical needs can make contractual approaches im-
practical and unethical.
One of the main concerns with the libertarian perspective is that the
conditions for efficient market allocation based on supply and demand do
not exist in the health-care or health-insurance markets. 143 Although in-
dividuals have the right to make their own treatment decisions in many
settings, they often defer to providers and insurance companies because
of information asymmetry, uncertain health risks, and limits on benefits.
Moreover, consumers do not necessarily pay the full cost of health care
or receive the full value of the goods and services they choose to
137 See generally H. TRISTRAM ENGLEHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BioETHIcs (1st
ed. 1986).
138 See Overriding Autonomy, supra note 126, at 43.
139 See generally David M. Cutler et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J.
ECON. 526 (2000) (studying how managed care impacts the quality of treatment for heart
disease and the cost of illness).
140 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in Man-
aged Care 273 JAMA 330, 333 (1995) ("[Managed care] incentives are not inherently unethi-
cal, but they can be depending on their design and intensity.").
141 See id. at 331 ("The foundation of the patient-physician relationship is the trust that
physicians are dedicated first and foremost to serving the needs of their patients.")
142 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2005).
143 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am.
ECON. REV. 941, 948-54 (1963) (examining certain characteristics of medical care that make it
unique as a commodity) [hereinafter Uncertainty].
2006]
426 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:403
purchase.144 Also, market failures - such as the public goods aspects of
medical knowledge, the externality effects of communicable diseases, the
failure to serve vulnerable populations, uncertainty, asymmetric informa-
tion, moral hazard, adverse selection, and equity concerns - provide a
rationale for public intervention in financing (and sometimes provision
of) health care.
Another approach based on the free-market view is "rationing
through choice," which claims to "[accommodate] diverse individual
health and allocational preferences, and thus respects autonomy." 145 In
this model, individuals ration health care at the micro-allocational level
through ex ante choices among various health plans. 146 The rationing-
through-choice system, designed to use existing market mechanisms for
health-care delivery, requires all individuals to contribute to a publicly
funded health-care system, which would fund health plans or provide
vouchers for purchasing private or public plans. 147 Plans that exceeded a
certain government-allocated amount per capita would be more expen-
sive to purchase.148
This allocation model is similar to a "prudential insurer" system, in
which initial resources are equal, 149 information on costs, benefits, and
risks is widely accessible, and health-care and insurance markets func-
tion freely. Thus, individuals' choices would define the fair and final
allocation of health resources. Dworkin, in particular, has focused on
this approach, drawing on Rawls's "veil of ignorance" concept. Dworkin
argues that the needs of a "representative individual" should shape the
health-care budget and distribution of health-care resources. 150 The
"representative individual" has an average income, full knowledge of the
costs and benefits of health interventions, and the prevalence and inci-
dence of disease, but no knowledge of his or her own genetic or medical
disposition. Rakowski applies a hypothetical choice mechanism for indi-
viduals to make ex ante resource allocation choices and consent to cer-
tain rationing principles, such as life maximization. 15 1 Elhauge argues,
144 See Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing: A Solution to Health Care Resource Allo-
cation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1573, 1578-80 (1992). [hereinafter Regulatory Rationing].
145 Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1032.
146 See id. at 1031.
147 See id. at 1036.
148 See id.
149 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part H: Equality of Resources, 10(4) PHILOS-
OPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS at 288 (1981) [hereinafter Part I1]; See also Ronald Dworkin, What
is Equality? Part : Equality of Welfare, 10(3) PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 185 (1981)
[hereinafter Part 1].
150 See Part I supra note 149; Part H supra note 149.
151 See generally EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 10; Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving
Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1063 (1993).
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however, that consensual theories "cannot offer a complete moral justifi-
cation for health care allocations."' 152
In opposition to the free-market view, one finds the widely dis-
cussed bureaucratic, technocratic or legislative protocol approach to allo-
cating resources. 153  This category of views are sometimes called
"controlled" or "regulatory rationing" because legislators take primary
control of allocating resources and weighing social costs and benefits in
order to set priorities. 154 Conceptually, regulatory approaches to ration-
ing merge with technocratic models. Technocratic allocation is managed
by a group of experts and is authoritatively designed. The main criticism
of the technocratic approach is that it is too centralized and does not
involve enough public input or fair procedures. Democratic approaches
ensure widespread public input and open local and national dialogue in
distributing health services and goods.
E. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES
Given the persistent disagreement about principles governing re-
source allocation, some argue that we must retreat to fair deliberative
processes. 155 This approach abandons "direct appeals to theories of jus-
tice," using instead "a finely honed understanding of the democratic pro-
cess... to reach decisions about priorities." 156 Fleck supports the use of
democratic political procedures to make micro-allocational decisions by
reaching a "reasoned agreement" on a "collective standard."'1 57 Daniels
and Sabin advocate publicly accessible decision-making for managed
care decisions, 158 while Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have iden-
tified certain procedural and substantive principles to ensure fair deliber-
ative processes. 159 These proposals have been criticized for providing
little guidance on the "rightness of the rationales put forward ... [or] any
assurance of substantively just outcomes. '160
In some democratic approaches to allocating resources, citizens, as
payers of insurance and consumers of health-care, are involved in demo-
cratic deliberation and allocation decisions. 16 1 Such approaches are con-
152 Allocating Health, supra note 110, at 1456.
153 See, e.g., Health Care Rationing, supra note 7.
154 See Regulatory Rationing , supra note 144.
155 See, e.g., Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19.
156 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES Of BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (fifth
edition 2001) at 258 [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 2].
157 Health Care Rationing, supra note 7, at 1601.
158 SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY, supra note 8.
159 See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-
MENT (1996).
160 Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 115.
161 See, e.g., SETTING LIMrrS FAIRLY, supra note 8.; HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82; Health
Care Rationing, supra note 7; Howard M. Leichter, Political Accountability in Health Care
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sidered fair because they are determined by patient choice. Anderson,
for example, argues that individual autonomy is realized on a collective
scale through democratic institutions. 62
One democratic decision-making model is the "informed demo-
cratic consensus model," 163 which proposes a district health council
composed of about fifty citizens. Each council would elect one person to
serve as its representative to a national health congress, which would
oversee a single comprehensive health plan. The national legislature
would set the overall budget for the plan, and the national health con-
gress would establish priorities and rationing protocols.
All of these prototypes espouse the principles of autonomy, political
equality, deliberation, and explicit public processes. Fleck also proposes
"constitutional principles of healthcare justice"1 64 that would
"avoid.. .giving political legitimacy to results of the deliberative process
that are seriously unjust." 165 Patients have the most stake in health allo-
cation decisions, Fleck argues, because they are the recipients of care as
well as the payers of health care, in taxes, insurance premiums, co-pays,
deductibles, user fees, and other charges. The endpoint would be a set of
rationing protocols, such as a list of services covered to which all would
have to adhere. 166
A number of criticisms of democratic procedures have emerged in
the literature. Some argue, for example, that neither Daniels' approach
nor other theories of just processes are ever entirely culture-free, abstract,
or universal. 167 Others criticize Daniels' account of the conditions of
procedural fairness on the grounds that the "relevance condition" is too
normative. 168 Since accepted reasons in a democratic process may be
"theory-laden, or embedded in particular conceptions of justice," 169 it
might be difficult for participants to choose among competing principles
Rationing: In Search of a New Jerusalem, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1992); James A. Morone,
The Bias of American Politics: Rationing Health Care in a Weak State, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1923 (1992); Jack H. Nagel, Combining Deliberation and Fair Representation in Community
Health Decisions, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1965 (1992).
162 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) [hereinafter VALUE
IN ETHICS].
163 Health Care Rationing, supra note 7, at 1617.
164 Leonard Fleck, Healthcare Justice and Rational Democratic Deliberation, 1(2) AM. J.
BIoETHICS 20 (2001).
165 Id. at 20.
166 Sarah Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18
Am. J. L. & Med. 97 (1992).
167 See Mark H. Waymack, Daniels on Justice and Healthcare: Laudable Goals - Ques-
tionable Method, 1(2) AM. J. BIOETHiCS 28 (2001); WHOSE JUSTICE, supra note 6.
168 See Samuel Gorovitz, Justice in Healthcare and Dimpled Chads, 1(2) AM. J.
BIOETHICS 29 (2001).
169 Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 115.
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of justice "in a particular distributive context."' 170 Emanuel argues that
Daniels use of democratic political procedures as a "last resort" to "re-
solve all remaining problems" when defining policy is based on a con-
ception of democratic political procedure that is practical, not
philosophical. Currently, these frameworks have provided little guidance
on how to agree on principles of justice or what the content of those
principles should entail. They also provide little guidance on the evalua-
tion of the outcomes of such procedures. As a result, deliberative demo-
cratic approaches raise objections about indeterminacy,' 7 1 given the "risk
that no solution will emerge from the deliberation because the depth of
moral disagreement is so great." 172
Still others argue that using democratic procedures at the micro-
allocational level to ration health care affords less respect for autonomy
than does ex ante choice. 173 Emanuel criticizes collective political pro-
cedures for not permitting an agreed-upon, substantive conception of the
"good life."'174 For Beauchamp and Childress, it is "relatively unclear
about what makes democratic procedures fair, how to protect against un-
fair outcomes, whether citizen deliberators could ever satisfy the de-
mands of true deliberative democracy, and how much real agreement
they could reach."' 175 Additionally, Hadorn has noted that deliberative
democratic decisions tend to be most difficult to implement, given the
tendency to "rescue" suffering patients, even if their condition is not cov-
ered. 176 Moreover, such deliberations would have to consider the costs
and benefits of thousands of treatment options for thousands of diseases,
a task too onerous to produce fair rationing policies. Another criticism is
that "majority preferences, no matter how well informed and fair, will
sometimes eventuate in unjust outcomes."'1 77 Therefore, a purely, or
even primarily, procedural mechanism could "return us to the same fail-
ures of justice that we have already encountered in health care."' 78
While all of these approaches strive for a just distribution of health-
care resources, one medical ethicist notes that "discordant positions, ir-
resolution, and an exhausted uncertainty seem the only conclusive prod-
ucts of three decades of discussion on medical ethics."' 179
170 Id. at 116.
171 HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82, at 32-34.
172 Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 115.
173 See, e.g., Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1096.
174 HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82, at 144.
175 See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 2, supra note 158, at 258.
176 Care Priorities, supra note 57.
177 See BIOMEDICAL ETHics 2, supra note 158, at 258.
178 Id.
179 HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82, at 6.
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F. SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SET OF
FRAMEWORKS
This section has examined a number of critical issues pertaining to
the current set of frameworks in health ethics, policy and law. In the
process, some major themes have emerged.
First, existing frameworks, even those that include health assess-
ment, have typically justified health care as a special social good. Uni-
versal concerns of social justice with respect to health itself have
received less attention. More work must focus on the question of why
health, as opposed to health care, has special moral importance. 180 The
traditional bias seems to stem from at least one assumption: that health is
not an appropriate focal variable for assessing social justice, whereas
utilities, community values, liberties, opportunities, resources and pri-
mary goods are. As Daniels argues, "health is an inappropriate object,
but health care, action which promotes health, is appropriate."' 18' He and
others emphasize that, "a right claim to equal health is best construed as
a demand for equality of access or entitlement to health services."'
182
Such reasoning illustrates a bias against health as a focal variable in cur-
rent frameworks. However, the focus on health care has led one to be-
lieve that the major inequity in health policy is differential access to care,
not differences in health.1 83 This emphasis has left a void on the philo-
sophical foundations of health and its distribution. 18 4
Second, efforts to establish fair procedures for allocating resources
claims more attention than the development of substantive and procedu-
ral principles for prioritizing health-related goods and services. This im-
balance stems, in part, from the way in which medical ethics.
Establishing a right to health care has been central for decades and has
thrust the field into a plethora of efforts to determine the content of a
right to health care.185 Despite the emphasis on fair procedures, moreo-
ver, there is little agreement on how and whether to specify such a
right. 186 However, the focus on democratic procedures as a way of dis-
180 See generally Justice and Health Policy, supra note 15; ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE supra
note 15; Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health and Development, 362 LANCET 678 (2003) [hereinafter
Health and Development].
181 JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 19, at 6.
182 Id. at 7.
183 See Dan Brock, Broadening the Bioethics Agenda, 10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS JOUR-
NAL 21 (2000) [hereinafter Bioethics Agenda]; TIMOTHY EvANS ET AL., Introduction to CHAL-
LENGING INEQUITIES IN HEALTH: FROM ETHICS TO ACTION, 48 (Timothy Evans et al. eds.,
2001).
184 See Right to Health, supra note 22, for a philosophical justification of health and its
distribution
185 See, e.g., Minimum of Health Care, supra note 48; JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 19;
Right to Health, supra note 22.
186 See Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 111; Agency and Quality, supra note 23.
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tributing health care leaves scholars without a moral theory of prioritiza-
tion and resource allocation and neglects the importance of individual
and social agency. It also leaves the field without a principled approach
to the problem of giving priority to the most disadvantaged and improv-
ing the overall health of the population. 18 7
Third, there is a need for workable frameworks to guide collective
choices about valuable social ends and their tradeoffs. It is clear that
purely procedural strategies are limited in their application to health eth-
ics, policy and law. However, it is less clear which methodology might
best elicit individual preferences for health states and incorporate them
into a collective choice,' 88 or whether this is the route to pursue at all.
CEA, CUA and CBA have encountered criticism on a number of
grounds, including their indifference to distributional effects and the
plight of the worse off.189 Although there have been efforts to quantify
equity concerns and include them in cost-utility models, 190 such ap-
proaches still lack a deliberative component that enables groups to reach
"reflective considered judgments." 91
A fourth theme involves the question of whether individual, or so-
cial, preferences and values should prioritize social goals and interven-
tions aimed at reaching those goals. While preferences based on societal
values should be included in CEA as the public's distributive prefer-
ences, 192 it is unclear what role these preferences might play in the devel-
opment of public policy. 193
Fifth, public reasoning should receive more emphasis than formal
quantitative, aggregative or purely procedural methods for making health
policy. Thus, there has been more focus on "accountability for reasona-
bleness" than on understanding how individuals and groups value differ-
ent aspects of health and agree upon decisions. Eliciting an acceptable
public response about resource allocation requires greater clarity about
shared moral values. The field of health ethics, policy and law has much
to learn from work in the fields of social choice and public choice theory.
187 See Bioethics Agenda, supra note 183, at 28-29.
188 See Social Values, supra note 71.
189 See Bioethics Agenda, supra note 183.
190 See, e.g., COST-VALUE ANALYSIS, supra note 70; PETER UBEL, PRICING LIFE (2000).
191 Bioethics Agenda, supra note 183, at 29.
192 See COST-VALUE ANALYSIS, supra note 70, at 89-90 (discussing whom to ask about
health-related quality of life in order to assess distributive preferences); Social Values, supra
note 71, at 258-59.
193 See Inequalities in Health, supra note 65, at 114-19 (discussing three approaches to
creating empirical guides for setting health-care priorities and policies).
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Sixth, existing frameworks fail to ensure justice in rationing because
they are indeterminate and do not solve the four rationing problems
noted above. 194 Related to these issues are more specific concerns:
(1) Using maximum benefit, utilities, or best outcomes as a basis
for resource allocation confers lower priority to those who
might benefit less from the use of a limited resource;1 95
(2) A strong focus on helping those in greatest need must reconcile
the trend towards avoidance of the so-called "bottomless pit
problem;" 196
(3) Summation techniques fail to respect individuality; 197
(4) Incommensurability: that all benefits are not equal and therefore
cannot be assessed according to a single metric (money in CBA,
and utilities in CUA);1 98
194 See A Challenge, supra note 7, at 27-29. See Norman Daniels, Justice, Fair Proce-
dures, and the Goals of Medicine, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10 (1996); and Norman Daniels,
Liberalism and Medical Ethics, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41 (1992) [hereinafter Medical
Ethics].
195 See Erik Nord, The Relevance of Health State after Treatment in Prioritising Between
Different Patients, 19 J. MED. ETHICS 37, 37-39 (1993) [hereinafter Health State]. In an em-
pirical study of Norwegian subjects, Nord found that individuals "tended to emphasise [sic]
equality in value of life and in entitlement to treatment rather than level of health after treat-
ment" when asked about their ethical preferences in prioritizing among health programs.
196 See Erik Nord, The QALY - A Measure of Social Value Rather than Individual Util-
ity?, 3 HEALTH ECON. 89 (1994) [hereinafter The QALY]; Health State, supra note 195, at
39-41; Erik Nord et al., Maximizing Health Benefits vs. Egalitarianism: An Australian Survey
of Health Issues, 41 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1429, 1433-34 (1995) [hereinafter Health Benefits];
HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 27-29. In their empirical studies of ethical preferences,
Nord et al., are increasingly finding that individuals are reluctant to deny benefits to patients
who have less potential for health than others.
197 The utilitarian notion of maximizing collective or social benefit disregards the sepa-
rateness of persons. By measuring utility on a single quantitative scale, it posits global popula-
tion utility as being experienced by one individual. Korsgaard in particular argues that one
cannot apply a principle of "moral addition" by combining the respective assessments of hap-
piness of two different individuals. See We Can Share, supra note 56, at 29. Rai, however,
argues that these criticisms about utilitarianism are ungrounded because:
The[y]. . . are based on two faulty assumptions: first, that benefit or utility max-
imization would be an ex post calculation; and second, that such maximization
would be imposed on individuals by an external decisionmaker. By contrast, the
central issue for just distribution of scarce health care resources must be what distri-
bution scheme individuals choose ex ante.
Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1061.
198 See Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779,
796 (1994) [hereinafter Valuation in Law] ("incommensurability occurs when the relevant
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judg-
ments about how these goods are best characterized.") In terms of health, this means that
different health conditions, such as deafness, blindness, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, de-
pression, cystic fibrosis, autism, and loss of limb cannot be compared because differing values
cannot be reduced to a unitary quantitative scale. Critics of commensurability differ in the
degree to which different values can be compared. Sunstein, for example, does not rule out the
ordinal or qualitative ranking of values, though he sees no ethical foundation in their cardinal
comparison. Sunstein also believes, as do Anderson and I, that individual and collective
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(5) A lack of a reasonableness threshold: aggregation techniques
can produce results that defy clinical judgment by, for example,
ranking life-saving treatments below199 those that improve qual-
ity of life;200
rational choices can be made among incommensurate alternatives. Id. at 809, n.108 (discuss-
ing Anderson); VALUE IN ETHICS, supra note 162, at 59-64. See generally ARISTOTELIAN
JUSTICE supra note 15; Right to Health, supra note 22. For more on incomplete theorization,
see Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) [here-
inafter Agreements]. Raz holds a slightly different view-that rational choices cannot be made
among incommensurable or incomparable alternatives. See MoRALITY, supra note 114, at 339
(discussing that choices made between incommensurate options appear rational because the
actor has made a comparative value between the options). For more on this, see generally
Martha C. Nussbaum, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in LovE's KNOWLEDGE: Es-
SAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (Martha C. Nussbaum ed., 1990).
199 An extension of the commensurability problem occurs when one compares improve-
ments in health status with saving or extending life. For example, in employing QALY max-
imization, 2 years of additional life with a 0.5 quality adjustment is deemed equivalent to one
year of additional life with no quality adjustment (e.g., a fully healthy life). In addition, saving
the life of 25 people for one year is deemed equivalent to saving the life of five people for five
years or one person for twenty-five years. Kamm argues that individuals' judgments regarding
aggregation differ when saving lives are at issue because any other change in health status
(increase or decrease) cannot compete with life saving as a health outcome. See generally
MORALITY, supra note 114. See Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1067 (discuss-
ing why these concerns about incommensurability do not "invalidate QALY maximization as
an ex ante rationing choice."). Rai claims that even incommensurabilists would "find QALY
maximization to be the ex ante decision principle that most accurately reflected the trade-offs
they would make between cost and various types of health benefit." Id. at 1068.
200 See Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2219-220 (invoking the "rule of rescue" value,
whereby individuals and the public at large value saving identifiable lives as a higher-order
value); The QALY, supra note 196, at 92 (noting the QALY concept does not "work in com-
parisons of life saving interventions with interventions that improve health or increase life
expectancy."). There are two issues here: one is whether there is a real and significant higher-
order value in saving "identifiable lives" over both saving "statistical lives" and providing
other health benefits. The second is whether there is a real and significant higher-order value
in saving all lives (both identifiable and statistical) over providing other health benefits.
Hadorn (Care Priorities, supra note 57), Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian (ECONOMic APPROACH,
supra note 50), and Eddy (David M. Eddy, The Individual vs. Society: Is There Conflict?, 265
JAMA 1446-50 (1991) [hereinafter Individual vs. Society]; David M. Eddy, Oregon's Meth-
ods: Did Cost-Effectiveness Fail?, 266 JAMA 2135, 2140 (1991) [hereinafter Oregon's
Method] all note that saving identifiable lives has "symbolic" or "altruistic" value or even
"vicarious utility" that providing other health benefits does not. Gibbard argues that although
these values are irrational and will not maximize life due to the higher-order ranking of "iden-
tifiable lives" over "statistical lives," symbolic or expressive values embody "compassion" and
strengthen the "social fabric" of a society. Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and
the Intrinsic Reward of a Life, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 165-193 (J.
Elster and A. Hylland, eds., 1986). Hadorn, however, argues that saving identifiable lives
should not be traded for other health benefits. See Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2219-
2225. See also John Harris, QALYfing the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117 (1987)
(stating that identifiable lives should have lexical and higher-order priority). My view aligns
closely with those of Pildes and Anderson (see generally Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Demo-
cratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2145-61 (1990)) and Sunstein (See generally Valua-
tion in Law, supra note 200), who support higher-order values but do not endorse lexical
ordering that protects certain values against all trade-offs. See ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra
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(6) Indeterminacy: The indeterminacy of distributive principles for
guiding resource allocation is especially problematic in pluralis-
tic environments where participants cannot agree about moral
constraints on rationing;
(7) Adaptive preferences: if preferences are used to allocate re-
sources, there is some disagreement as to whose preferences
should take priority20 1 (e.g., those of citizens, 20 2 medical ex-
perts, patients, payers, regulators, etc.). Those with particular
health conditions and disabilities have been found to modify
their preferences to cope with their conditions; different prefer-
ences can result in underestimating or overestimating treatment
benefits;20 3
(8) Methods for eliciting preferences, costs and benefits differ and
produce different results (e.g. WTP, WTA, CV, standard gam-
ble, rating scale.) In the Oregon experiment, some argue con-
cerns over the accuracy of measured costs and benefits
discredited the cost-utility methodology; 204
(9) Decisions about benefits packages are unresolved: whether to
guarantee and/or mandate a benefits package, which services to
include and exclude, whether to provide a floor and/or a ceiling
for benefits, whether to guarantee a decent minimum, a basic
benefits package, or a comprehensive benefits package;
note 15; Right to Health, supra note 22; Justice and Health Policy, supra note 15. This view
is concordant with the culture and ethics of the health profession. For a discussion on physi-
cian obligations of beneficence, see BIOMEDICAL ETHIcs, supra note 47.
201 See Jeff Richardson & Erik Nord, The Importance of Perspective in the Measurement
of Quality-Adjusted Life Years, 17 MED. DECISION MAKING 33, 41 (1997). Nord and Jeff
Richardson found that perspectives (e.g., personal or impersonal) for eliciting preference can
significantly alter the values incorporated into QALY analysis. See The QALY, supra note
196, at 92.
202 See Joanna Coast, Citizens, Their Agents and Health Care Rationing: An Exploratory
Study Using Qualitative Methods, 10 HEALTH ECON. 159, 159 (2001). In the context of incor-
porating patient preferences into resource allocation decisions, a U.K. study found that "citi-
zens vary considerably in the extent to which they want to be directly involved in making
rationing decisions." This variation related to "knowledge and experience, objectivity and the
potential distress that denying care may cause."
203 Norman Daniels, Rationing Fairly; Programmatic Considerations, 7(2-3) BIOETHICS
224-33 (1993).
204 The counterargument is that completely accurate measurement of costs and benefits is
impossible to achieve, especially when multiple benefits and harms are involved. See generally
Individual vs. Society, supra note 202 (arguing that benefits to certain individuals are some-
times achieved only at a cost to overall societal health), and Oregon's Method, supra note 202
(arguing that allocating state Medicaid on a cost-effectiveness basis failed because it measured
medical benefits by outcomes provided to individuals rather than services provided to society).
The Panel on Cost-Effectiveness was convened in part to answer some of these questions and
standardize CEA in health and medicine, see generally PANEL REPORT, supra note 44.
HEALTH, CAPABILITY, AND JUSTICE
(10) Differences in view on what information to include in resource
allocation:205 (e.g. prevalence, incidence, effectiveness in
terms of quality-of-life, life-extending, life-saving effects,
overall economic impact on society, medical necessity, costs,
and some measure of economic efficiency measure such as
CEA, CUA or CBA );
(11) Unjust outcomes: if open and democratic processes determine
resource allocation, then the decisions might or might not be
just or consistent with clinical judgment; should they be ac-
cepted as a matter of procedural justice or be evaluated for
substantive content; and
(12) Costs and Efficiency: some liberal theories (e.g. equality of
opportunity) do not adequately address scarcity and efficiency,
set limits, or incorporate costs into their frameworks.
This critical review demonstrates that the academic area of health
ethics, policy and law is at a crossroads; oscillating between two dichoto-
mous paradigmatic positions: consequentialism and proceduralism -
which adherents often present as mutually exclusive. Consequentialists
argue that we should assess health policies and laws by their conse-
quences; proceduralists believe that fair processes will yield fair deci-
sions. Thus far, neither end of the philosophical spectrum has promised
or delivered a plausible solution, and attempts to incorporate both posi-
tions have been unsatisfactory. As a result, the field is at a standstill.
Any movement forward involves elements of both the consequentialist
and proceduralist frameworks. Bearing both frameworks in mind, this
Article proposes a capability and health account which focuses on the
ability of health systems to provide the conditions under which individu-
als have the capability for health.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM: CAPABILITY AND
HEALTH ACCOUNT 20 6
A capability and health account, building on and integrating
Amartya Sen's capability approach and Aristotle's political philosophy,
contrasts with traditional health ethics, policy and law in arguing that
health capability, as opposed to health care, has special moral importance
205 An analysis in the United Kingdom discusses the issues that arise in presenting "com-
plex [medical] information" to patients and supports patients' ability to "take part in the ration-
ing debate." See S. Mclver, Information for Public Choice, 51 BRIT. MED. BULL. 900, 911
(1995).
206 See ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15 and Right to Health, supra note 22, for key
elements of a theoretical framework embodying an account of capability and health that builds
on and integrates Aristotle's political theory, Sen's capability approach and a social choice
paradigm known as incompletely theorized agreements. This section summarizes only a few
major aspects of this theoretical framework and draws from Social Justice, supra note 15.
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because of its status as an end of political and societal activity.20 7 This
view draws on Aristotle's contention that society is obligated to promote
"human flourishing," 20 8 the ability to live a flourishing life. Flourishing
is critical to the human condition and health sustains other aspects of
human flourishing because, without being alive, no other human func-
tionings are possible, including agency, the ability to lead a life one has
reason to value.209 Public policy should therefore focus on the ability to
function, and health policy should aim to maintain and improve this abil-
ity by meeting health needs and ensuring the conditions for health
agency.210 This view values health intrinsically and more directly than
solely "instrumental" social goods such as income or health care. It
gives special moral importance to what I call health capability; an indi-
vidual's ability to achieve good health and thus avoid preventable mor-
bidity and premature death.211 A capability and health account also
considers human agency. Permitting people to exercise their agency en-
ables them to value and prioritize health domains (e.g. to trade-off qual-
ity and quantity of life) and health services.212
A. AN AGENCY-ORIENTED VIEW
As discussed above, the capability approach is an agency-oriented
view. Agency is important for public policy because it supports individ-
uals' direct participation in "economic, social and political actions" and
enables individuals to make decisions "as active agents of change. 213
This approach contrasts with the view that individuals are passive recipi-
ents of medical care, medical expenditure decisions, or other public poli-
cies. Thus, the agency-centered view promotes individuals' ability to
understand and "shape their own destiny and help each other. '214 From a
capability perspective, exercising personal freedom and participating in
social choice should shape and influence policy and institutions.215 And
"[p]olitical and civil rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing
of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, are central to the
207 See generally ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Health and Development, supra
note 180, at 678; Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1075.
208 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 12; THE POLITICS, supra note 12; Human Function-
ing, supra note 12, at 202-46; Good as Discipline, supra note 12, at 312-41; Political Distribu-
tion, supra note 12, at 152-86. Both Sen and Nussbaum have advanced versions of the
capability approach, while I draw on both to develop theory, I build to a greater extent on
Sen's version.
209 See generally COMMODITIES, supra note 11; FREEDOM, supra note 16; and INEQUAL-
ITY, supra note 11.
210 Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1075; ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15.
211 See Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1076.
212 Id.
213 FREEDOM, supra note 16, at xiii.
214 Id. at 11.
215 Id. at 5.
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processes of generating informed and reflected choices. '2 16 Under this
view, public policy is a process that expands individual freedom.
Another implication of an agency-oriented view is the interrelation-
ship between health and agency. 21 7 Good health enables individuals to
affect public policy and to participate in individual, political and social
decision-making, both inside and outside the health sector. The opportu-
nity to exercise one's agency might also relate to an individual's health
because impaired agency through, for example, overt or insidious op-
pression, can reduce mental and physical functioning.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A capability and health account has several implications for public
policy. First, such a view is important for assessing social inequalities
and evaluating the effects of social policy on broader health determi-
nants.2 1 8 Unlike Daniels and his colleagues, who advocate policies
"aimed at equalizing individual life opportunities, such as investment in
basic education, affordable housing, income security, and other forms of
antipoverty policy,"219 a capability and health account emphasizes the
need to evaluate both health and health policy in a larger policy context,
which requires a broader understanding of social justice. From a capabil-
ity point of view, it is argued, health and its determinants must be
weighed in relation to other social ends in an inclusive and democratic
discussion about the ends and means of public policy, and specifically
health policy. 220
This approach to health also argues, however, that health care is
important and special. Due to its influence on health, society must guar-
antee healthcare so that health improves overall and health inequalities
attributable to health care diminish.
This account does not provide a detailed list or specification of
which type of health care should be guaranteed or to what level. Rather,
although it can help identify the parameters of a comprehensive benefits
package, it recognizes the need for further specification through a pro-
cess that combines both substantive and procedural principles: a joint
scientific and deliberative approach (discussed below). Substantively,
Sen's notion of "basic capabilities" provides guidance. This Article ex-
216 Id. at 153.
217 Social Justice, supra note 15; Health and Development, supra note 180; Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Combating HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries, 329 BRrr. MED. J. 121, 121 (2004)
[hereinafter Combating HIVIAIDS].
218 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ethics of the Social Determinants of Health, 364 LANCET 1092,
1092-97 (2004) [hereinafter Social Determinants].
219 OUR HEALTH, supra note 102, at 25.
220 Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1076; See generally Social Deterninants, supra note
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tends this formulation to health and generally argues for societal efforts
to bring each individual's functioning as close as possible to, or above, a
certain threshold functioning level (insofar as an individual's circum-
stances permit). "Basic capabilities" include the ability to avoid es-
capable morbidity and premature death. Regarding how much priority to
give to society's worst-off individuals, this account promotes the use of
"public reasoning" to forge a compromise between strict maximization
and prioritization 22' (discussed below).
This "process aspect" of freedom in the capability approach has im-
plications for health-related policy formulation. It emphasizes an indi-
vidual's ability to participate in broad public policy decision-making
(e.g. in prioritizing military versus health care programs) and health pol-
icy decision-making (e.g. in prioritizing domains of health and health
care for resource allocation).
A joint scientific and deliberative approach can help define a com-
prehensive benefits package to which all should have equal access, and
help prioritize different types of health care in order to maintain and im-
prove health with the fewest possible resources. Such a process is not
merely instrumental, however, this approach values individuals' role in
decision-making that affects them. It also insists that valid and reliable
information on benefits, risks and costs should inform the decision-mak-
ing process.
This account does not divorce the equity implications of access to
health care from the equity implications of its financing. Rather, it stipu-
lates that resources be allocated on the basis of medical necessity and
medical appropriateness (discussed below), rather than ability to pay.222
From this perspective, "protective security," 223 through health insurance,
is a necessary safety net.224 And all should share the economic burden of
health care by redistributing funds from the rich to the poor and the well
to the ill through community rating and progressive financing. 225
An ethical framework that intrinsically values health necessitates
the conceptualization and measurement of health and inequalities in its
many domains.226 Even within this perspective, one must determine the
most appropriate set of inequality measures for a given exercise. Else-
221 Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1076; See generally Social Determinants, supra note
218.
222 See Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1077.
223 FREEDOM, supra note 16, at 45.
224 Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1077. See also Catastrophic Health, supra note 36.
225 Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1077.
226 See Sudhir Anand et al., Measuring Disparities in Health, in CHALLENG N INEQUALI-
TIES IN HEALTH 48, 50 (Timothy Evans et al. eds., 2001).
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where, I have argued for using "shortfall equality" as a measure for eval-
uating deprivations in health capabilities. 227
C. INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED AGREEMENTS
Incomplete theorization is usefully applied to health ethics, policy
and law because it provides a model for understanding collective deci-
sion-making on human goods that are plural and fuzzy, such as health
and inequality.228 It also enables people to take different paths to com-
mon, often partial, agreements. Incomplete theorization describes how
people with divergent, even opposing, views on health, equity, health
policy and law might agree in specific situations, and thus, generate deci-
sions that are legitimate, stable and mutually respectful. 229
An incompletely theorized agreement (ITA), as developed by Cass
Sunstein, is not uniformly theorized at all levels, and ranges from high-
level justifications to low-level particulars. 230  I employ ITA to extend
and operationalize the capability approach at three different levels.
23
'
The first level is the conceptual level, which specifies the valuable func-
tionings that constitute human flourishing and health. The second level
is the policy level, which specifies policies and laws. The third level is
the intervention level, which specifies actions in particular cases and de-
cisions about medical treatments, public health interventions or social
services. 232 Three types of ITA constitute the model: incompletely spec-
ified agreements, incompletely specified and generalized agreements,
and incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.
Incompletely specified agreements occur when there is agreement
on a general principle but sharp disagreement about particular cases. For
227 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE supra note 15; Justice and Health Policy supra note 15; Right
to Health, supra note 22; Jennifer Prah Ruger and Hak-Ju Kim, Global Inequalities: An
International Comparison, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH, (in press 2006); Jen-
nifer Prah Ruger, Measuring Disparities in Health Care, BRrr. MED. J., 333, 274 (2006)
[hereinafter Healthcare Disparities].
228 See ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15. See also, Justice and Health Policy, supra
note 15, Theorized Agreements, supra note 30.
229 See Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1077.
230 See Agreements, supra note 198 at 1739.
231 It is important to note, before moving on, that the ITA framework is applied here only
to one aspect of the Aristotelian and capability points of view-that of the social choice exer-
cise of coming to agreement - thus the use of ITA in this framework is one aspect of the
theory, which complements, rather than substitutes, for the capability or Aristotelian
viewpoint.
232 See generally ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Justice and Health Policy, supra
note 15. On obtaining collective agreement on the selection and weighting of health capabili-
ties, see Right to Health, supra note 22. For an analysis of U.S. health reform from the per-
spective of value-based arguments of different levels of generality, see generally Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Health, Health Care and Incompletely Theorized Agreements: A Normative Theory of
Health Policy Decision-Making, 32 J. HEALTH, PoLITICs, POLICY & LAW (in press 2007)
[hereinafter Normative Theory].
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example, in the health policy and law context, citizens might agree that
the high-level principle utilitarianism is the underlying ethical principle
of health policy and law. Despite their focus on the greatest social good,
they might also agree that beta-interferon, a drug that helps some individ-
uals with multiple sclerosis (MS), should be provided to MS patients
even though its cost per QALY ranges from $35,000 to $20 million. Or
they may agree that kidney dialysis ought to be provided despite its very
expensive cost for relatively small improvements in health-related qual-
ity-of-life. 233
Incompletely specified and generalized agreements occur when peo-
ple agree on a mid-level principle but disagree about both the more high-
level theory that accounts for it and the outcomes generated by particular
controversies. In the health policy and law context, for example, citizens
might agree that all should have access to life saving interventions, but
disagree on the underlying philosophical justification for this view and
on whether all life saving interventions at all ages should be made
available.234
Incompletely theorized agreements based on particular outcomes
describe how people agree on particular policy options and legal deci-
sions. In this model, parties agree on low-level principles that are not
necessarily derived from a particular high-level theory of the right or the
good. People might agree, for instance, that governments should eradi-
cate malaria, prevent famine and prohibit genital mutilation, but they
might not know exactly why they hold such beliefs. 235 This aspect of the
framework complements the capability approach's emphasis on partial
agreements and workable solutions, which can be "based on the contin-
gent acceptance of particular provisions, without demanding complete
social unanimity. '236
For these reasons and those articulated elsewhere, the ITA frame-
work is useful in developing a capability and health account. If we are to
develop a new paradigm of health ethics, policy and law, we must con-
struct a framework that permits us to prioritize health goods and services
amidst widespread disagreement. Policy evaluation poses these difficul-
ties in particular contexts. The combination of the capability and ITA
approaches enables reasoned agreement on particular health interven-
tions without resolving all the incompleteness of such choices.
233 See Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1078; ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15.
234 See Social Justice, supra note 15, at 1078.
235 See id.
236 See FREEDOM, supra note 16, at 253.
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III. APPLICATIONS
A. EQUITABLE ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY HEALTH CARE2 3 7
1. A Capability and Health Account of Equal Access 238
The paradigm presented here evaluates the impact of healthcare on
individuals' capability to function. 23 9 It assesses what I call health capa-
bility by examining health needs, 240 health agency,24 1 and health
norms.
242
This approach to equal access rests on Aristotle's principle of just
distribution, or proportional justice, that like cases should be treated sim-
ilarly and unlike cases differently, 243 in proportion to their difference.
This account is primarily needs-based and cases are considered alike if
they have the same health need and unlike if they have different health
needs. Below I take this line of inquiry a step further, arguing that
healthcare must be medically necessary and medically appropriate. This
theory supports the allocation of resources to those with health needs in
efforts to bring them as close as possible to a threshold level of function-
ing as their circumstances permit. Thus, the quality of health care pro-
vided to all should be measured by its ability to address the functional
impairment arising from injury or illness.
For health care, this paradigm implies that the government should
make efforts to bring each individual's health functioning as close to a
certain threshold level of functioning as possible, insofar as an individ-
ual's circumstances permit, but that these efforts not sacrifice the health
functioning of others below the threshold functioning range. There is
considerable discussion about how much priority to give society's disad-
vantaged. Elsewhere I argue for use of shortfall equality as a measure
and standard for compromise between strict maximization and prioritiza-
237 See generally Agency and Quality, supra note 23 for a more extensive analysis and
justification for rethinking equal access in terms of alternative ethical aims. This section
draws on Agency and Quality, supra note 23.
238 See Agency and Quality, supra note 23 for an argument for rethinking equal access
such that society examines injustices not just by healthcare resources, but by the: (1) quality
of those resources and their capacity to enable effective health functioning; (2) extent to which
society supports what I call health agency so that individuals can convert healthcare resources
into health functioning; and (3) nature of health norms, which affect individuals' efforts to
achieve functioning. This section addresses only one component of this view of equal access
and draws on Agency and Quality, supra note 23 in doing so.
239 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15 and Social Justice, supra note 15.
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., ARISTOTELIAN. JusTCE, supra note 15 and Agency and Quality, supra note
23.
242 See Combating HIV/AIDS, supra note 217, Agency and Quality supra note 23, and
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Democracy and Health, Q. J. MED. 98, 299-304 (2005) [hereinafter
Democracy and Health].
243 See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 12, at 151.
2006]
442 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:403
tion in implementing an equal access principle, and below I advance rea-
sonable accommodation as a conceptual tool in hard cases244 and the
principle of proportional justice to guide resource distribution.
In order to determine which health care goods and services should
be guaranteed to individuals, this account of equal access must be sup-
plemented with a framework that combines both procedural and substan-
tive principles and integrates clinical and economic considerations. It
can help prioritize the different types of health care to maintain and im-
prove health with the fewest possible resources. It is not merely instru-
mental, however. Its justification lies in the concept of the good life that
the capability approach espouses: that individuals should have the ability
to participate in decision-making that affects them, such as decision-
making about the goods and services society should guarantee them.
This is discussed in Section C below.
2. Results, Achievements and the Capability to Achieve
This account raises two important questions: Does equal access
guarantee equal results? Must individuals with the same condition al-
ways receive the same amount of care?
It is difficult to assess the link between health care and health out-
comes, but the account presented here does not guarantee equal results or
equal achievements among recipients. However, the principle of equal
access implies that society must attempt to reduce inequalities in individ-
uals' capability to achieve health functionings and to prevent, ameliorate,
or eliminate deprivations in their capability for health functioning.
True to Aristotle's principle of proportionality, this approach does
not seek equal amounts of health care for individuals or groups with
very different shortfalls from a given threshold state of health function-
ing. This approach supports the idea that a progressive health-care deliv-
ery system provides goods and services to those with health needs,
justifying unequal amounts of care for patients with different conditions.
However, individuals with similar needs should receive the same level of
care. A potential problem arises when different people require different
amounts of goods and services to meet the same health need, as when
cases differ in severity or in the conversion of resources into improved
health. Under this account, every individual should be entitled to medi-
cally necessary and medically appropriate resources needed to reach a
medically determined level of health functioning.
244 ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Health and Social Justice, supra note 15; Right
to Health, supra note 22; Healthcare Disparities, supra note 227.
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3. Rationale for High-Quality Care
The argument for a decent minimum or adequate level of health
care typically asserts "a government obligation to meet the basic health
needs of all citizens, at least an obligation to function as a last resort. 245
The result is generally two tiers of health care, one involving "enforced
social coverage for basic and catastrophic health needs" 246 and the other
permitting "voluntary private coverage for other health needs and
desires. ' 247 The decent minimum concept is analogous to a general
safety net. It appeals to several different philosophical perspectives such
as utilitarianism, communitarianism, and egalitarianism. 248 Operational-
ization is challenging, and regional, temporal, and socio-economic varia-
tions can result in differences in quality. 249 We must therefore ask why
disparities in healthcare quality should concern us and why efforts to
reduce them are justified.
Within this paradigm, unnecessarily reduced healthcare quality,
such as medical errors, is unjust because it undermines individuals' capa-
bility for health functioning. For example, giving the wrong type of
blood during organ transplantation, as happened in the United States, is
morally troubling, not because it threatens the patient's employment or
happiness, or provides less than a decent minimum or adequate level of
health care per se. The moral problem is the diminishment of the pa-
tient's capability to function or even survive. Differences in healthcare
quality that contradict evidenced-based standards,250 such as differences
in effectiveness and efficacy, are therefore unjust. The quality of health
care should therefore be measured in terms of its effect on functional
impairment.25 1
Two people with the same health condition will experience very
different health outcomes if one has access to high-quality medical care
and the other does not. Medical evidence demonstrates that children
with asthma need daily drug therapy to prevent airway swelling, but
many do not receive that standard of care.25 2 And although tight control
of blood sugar levels in type 1 diabetes reduces the risk of kidney disease
245 BIOMEDICAL ETmcs, supra note 47, at 356.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Mark A. Schuster, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Robert H. Brook, How Good is the Quality
of Health Care in the United States?, 76 MILBANK QUARTERLY 517 (1998).
250 Steven M. Asch et al., Who Is at Greatest Risk for Receiving Poor-Quality Health
Care?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147-1156 (2006).
251 See Leighton E. Cluff, Chronic Disease, Function and the Quality of Care, 34 J.
CHRONIC DISEASE 299-304 (1981).
252 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Research on Caring for Children with
Asthma, AHRQ Publication No. 00-P025 (2000).
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by two thirds and halves the risk of eye disease,253 40% of Americans
with type I diabetes do not receive a routine glucose monitoring. 254 In-
terventions that are known to maintain or improve health, and even lower
costs, are often unavailable to those in need.255 From this perspective,
such deficits are morally troubling because they reduce individuals' ca-
pability for health functioning.
"To err is human" and no perfect health-care system exists, but an
important health-system goal is equal access to high quality care. Each
person should receive those necessary and appropriate preventive mea-
sures and treatments that are available to others with similar needs.
Achieving this objective entails a continuous effort to standardize
medicine, reduce medical errors, and move toward a gold standard of
care.
2 5 6
There are at least two potential objections to the high-quality stan-
dard for equal access. The first is that it gives more priority to equality
than efficiency (expressing concern over draining resources and impov-
erishing even adequate care efforts). The second is that a two-tier system
might be more politically and administratively feasible. In response,
health systems accountable only for low quality could result in sub-opti-
mal care and inefficiencies in the long run, and thus efforts to increase
political support are critical- and yet not impossible- as demonstrated by
calls for action in the U.S. and U.K.
4. High-Quality Care and A Two Tiered System
Equal access to high-quality care and a two-tiered system are not
compatible. Unfortunately, universal access to high-quality health care is
not always available, even in wealthy countries like the United States,
where health care quality differentials are widespread. For example, the
National Committee for Quality Assurance found that 50% of diabetics
enrolled in managed care plans in New England received annual eye ex-
ams compared with only 33% in plans in the South Central U.S. re-
gion.2 5 7 Another study found in some locales twice as many diabetics
253 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, PUBL'N No. 00-P018, RESEARCH
ON DIABETES CARE (2000), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tripdiab.htm.
254 Id.
255 Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the
United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635-2645 (2003).
256 See generally To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000); COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(2001).
257 National Committee of Quality Assurance, The State of Managed Care Quality
(1997), available at http://www.ncqa.org/pages/communications/news/somcqrel.html.
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get routine care (glycosylated hemoglobin measurement, eye exams, and
total cholesterol measurement) as in others across three US states.258
In every society, various factors impede access to high-quality
health care including (1) economic barriers (lack of insurance, underin-
surance, poverty); (2) supply and distributional barriers (goods and ser-
vices are inappropriate, not of sufficient quality, or not nearby); (3)
socio-cultural and ethnic barriers (misunderstandings between providers
and clients of different backgrounds); 259 and (4) ignorance, misinforma-
tion and misunderstanding. In many societies, eliminating financial bar-
riers to care solves many access problems, although other impediments
to access persist.
Geographic impediments are particularly problematic. Patients in
remote rural areas, for example, are more likely to receive lower quality
care than those in more urban, populated areas. One study found that
HIV-infected patients living in rural areas were less likely to be taking
anti-HIV drug cocktails and receiving medication to prevent pneumonia
than those living in urban areas. 260 Rural HIV patients were also more
likely to have doctors significantly less experienced in dealing with HIV
patients.261 One study of heart bypass surgery in the United States found
that privately insured HMO patients in one part of the country received
higher quality care than their counterparts in other regions. 262
Similarly, socio-cultural barriers to access can result in misunder-
standings (in some cases, hostility) between providers and patients, mal-
treatment or lack of treatment, and wasted resources. Ethnic and socio-
linguistic barriers to care have been problematic in the United States.
One study that controlled for differences in health insurance and socio-
economic status found that Hispanic children whose parents did not
speak English experienced difficulty accessing health care.263 In a 2001
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation survey,264 19% of Latinos reported
that language problems kept them from seeking medical care. A differ-
258 See Wiener et al., Variation in Office-Based Quality: A Claims-Based Profile of Care
Provided to Medicare Patients With Diabetes, 273 JAMA 1503, 1505 (1995).
259 See CENTER FOR HEALTH ECONOMICS RESEARCH FOR THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUNDATION, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: KEY INDICATORS FOR POLICY (1993) [hereinafter
KEY INDICATORS FOR POLICY].
260 See S. E. Cohn et al., The Care of HIV-Infected Adults in Rural Areas of the United
States, 28(4) J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 385-92 (2001).
261 See id.
262 See Jos6 J. Escarce et al., Health Maintenance Organizations and Hospital Quality for
Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 56(3) MED. CARE RESEARCH & REV. 340-62 (1999).
263 See Robin M. Weinick & Nancy A. Krass, Racial and Ethic Differences in Children's
Access to Care, 90(11) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1771-4 (2000).
264 See generally KEY INDICATORS FOR POLICY, supra note 259.
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ent study found that Asians and Pacific Islanders on the West Coast 2 65
had less access to health care than any other ethnic group, including Afri-
can Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans or whites. Asians and Pa-
cific Islanders had the worst overall scores for ability to obtain treatment
when needed, as measured in length of waiting time before seeing a spe-
cialist or service approval, with a few exceptions.266 The many measures
that could reduce or even eliminate such impediments include outreach,
transportation, translation, interpretive services, health information, re-
specting human dignity, and communication campaigns in multiple lan-
guages. Health communication strategies that are socially, linguistically,
and culturally appropriate are especially effective in reducing gaps in
health education and knowledge regarding treatment options.
Shortages of high-quality health goods and services, including
health personnel, equipment, medicines, and facilities, erect significant
barriers to access on the supply side. In the past, some countries have
addressed these issues, although more effort is needed. For example, the
United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps has provided
scholarships and loan repayments to health professionals who practice in
underserved communities in the United States. In the United Kingdom,
physicians earn roughly 70% more to provide health services in under-
served communities. Another problem is the mismatch between health
resources and the health needs of the population.
Some of the most important impediments to equal access are eco-
nomic. Different payment methodologies and financial arrangements
within the health sector can affect both health-care quality and access. In
the U.S. health-insurance status influences both access to services and
the quality of care received. Health-insurance coverage also bears on
individual health. People without health insurance have repeatedly been
shown to utilize less healthcare than insured individuals. 267
Lack of health insurance may also prevent people from seeking
care. One national U.S. study found that adults who were uninsured dur-
ing a one-year period were two to four times more likely to have access
problems than those who were insured throughout the entire year. These
access problems included: not filling a prescription, not seeing a special-
ist when needed, skipping a medical test, treatment, or follow-up, or not
seeing a doctor when sick.268
265 Rani E. Snyder et al., Access to Medical Care Reported by Asians and Pacific Island-
ers in a West Coast Physician Group Association, 57(2) MEDICAL CARE RESEARCH AND RE-
vmw 196-215 (2000).
266 Id. at 203.
267 See generally Katherine Swartz, The Medically Uninsured; Special Focus on Workers,
NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM (1998).
268 See generally The Commonwealth Fund, Security Matters: How Instability in Health
Insurance Puts U.S. Workers at Work (2001).
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Uninsured patients are also up to four times as likely as insured
patients to require both hospitalization and emergency hospital care.
When hospitalized, those without health insurance receive less care and
are more likely to die during their stay than patients who are insured.269
And the United States does not compare favorably to other industri-
alized countries in terms of equal access to high quality care. For exam-
ple, a study of ten countries belonging to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (United States, United Kingdom, Switzer-
land, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, France, and Denmark)
found inequalities in health- care delivery that favored the rich, espe-
cially in Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom. 270
5. Voluntary Risk Compared with Involuntary Risk
A final matter that must be addressed in any paradigm of health
ethics, policy and law is how to handle the issue of voluntary versus
involuntary risk, and whether a principle of equal access to high-quality
health care would differ by the voluntary or involuntary nature of risk.
At first glance it appears that some people are not voluntarily risk
adverse to health consequences, such as when they smoke despite their
awareness of the risk of lung cancer. Some commentators think it is
worthy to make people who knowingly take risks with their health pay
additional sums of money or be solely responsible for paying for health
insurance and health care. Such a system, it is argued, would: (1) help
raise additional financing for services caused by bad health habits, and
(2) help mitigate the moral hazards of such situations by giving people
incentives to change their habits. 271
However, this theory suffers from several shortcomings. First, there
is some evidence that certain bad health habits, such as smoking and
heavy drinking, actually contribute more financially to society than they
cost. For example, society saves money when smokers fail to collect
social security payments because they die before becoming eligible. 272
Premature death from smoking could also avoid long-term care costs in-
curred by older patients. Second, many poor health habits, such as to-
bacco use, are highly addictive or heavily influenced by social factors
and it is not clear that they are solely voluntary. Third, even if these
269 See generally Katherine Swartz, Dynamics of People Without Health Insurance: Don't
Let the Numbers Fool You, 27 1(1) JAMA 64-66 (1994); Robert J. Blendon, What Should Be
Done About the Uninsured Poor?, 260(21) JAMA 3176-7 (1988); and Jack Hadley et al.,
Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients: Condition on Admission,
Resource Use, and Outcome, 265(3) JAMA 374-9 (1991).
270 See generally INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 36.
271 See generally EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 10.
272 See generally Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers
Pay Their Way?, 261(11) JAMA 1604 (1989).
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voluntary behaviors were responsible for significant additional health-
care costs, financial disincentives in the form of higher health-insurance
premiums might not change those behaviors.
Discussions by Gerald Dworkin27 3 and Elliott Sober 274 are instruc-
tive here. On the question of financial liability, Dworkin argues that
three conditions must be met before individuals should be held finan-
cially responsible for health risks. First, society must be able to under-
stand the respective causal determinants of voluntary versus involuntary
contributors to health risks. Second, it must determine the difference
between involuntary and voluntary behavior. Third, society must be able
to differentiate between genetic and non-genetic predisposition to dis-
ease. Sober's analysis focuses on interactions between biological and
environmental factors. Like Dworkin, he notes that several conditions
must be met in order to determine causation. He also notes that illness
typically results from the interaction between genes and environmental
factors such as lifestyle and diet. For example, the relative contributions
of alcohol abuse, genes, and environmental factors to the onset and se-
verity of chronic pancreatitis are difficult to disentangle. It is also diffi-
cult to understand why some who do not abuse alcohol develop
pancreatitis whereas others who drink heavily escape it. Moreover,
socio-cultural factors, such as poverty, also associate with poor health
habits because disadvantaged people are less equipped to bear the poten-
tial costs of mitigating the risks of such habits and paying for the result-
ing health effects of their behavior. For all of these reasons, it is unjust
to always blame individuals for their health problems, although individ-
ual responsibility and health agency are essential in achieving optimal
health outcomes.
B. EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT HEALTH FINANCING AND INSURANCE
1. A Capability and Health Account of Equitable and Efficient
Health Financing
Universal health insurance coverage is important to this paradigm
for several reasons. 275
First, one of the primary economic barriers to high quality health
care is lack of health insurance. Second, resource allocation in this para-
273 See Gerald Dworkin, Taking Risk, Assessing Responsibility, 11(5) HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 26 (1981).
274 See Elliott Sober, Appendix One: The Meaning of Genetic Causation, in FROM
CHANCE TO CHOICE 347 (Allen Buchanan et al. eds., 2000).
275 See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, QUARTERLY JOUR-
NAL OF MEDICINE (forthcoming) ( [hereinafter Moral Foundations] for an ethical argument
justifying universal health insurance coverage on the moral grounds of protecting individuals
from vulnerability and insecurity. This section draws on Moral Foundations, although it does
not address in depth philosophical components of this view of health insurance.
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digm is based on medical necessity and medical appropriateness, not
ability to pay. Third, the costs of health care can affect health directly by
reducing demand for necessary care or increasing consumption of unnec-
essary care. Fourth, the uncertainty of health need, the catastrophic costs
of medical care, individuals' risk-averse nature, and the need to redis-
tribute resources from well to ill and rich to poor, place risk pooling at
the center of health-care financing.
The paradigm presented here requires that health-system financing,
organization, and delivery ensure access to medically necessary and
medically appropriate care and protect individuals from health-related fi-
nancial burdens that could substantially erode their freedom to flourish.
This means that health policy should provide continuous universal
health insurance so that gaps in coverage do not handicap health func-
tioning. This arrangement should include all individuals at all times, re-
gardless of changes in income, employment, or marital or health status.
This account argues for financing health care according to ability to
pay (adjusting contributions to health-care costs by income level) and
delivering it according to medical necessity and medical appropriateness
(discussed below). Thus, society distributes health-care resources accord-
ing to individuals' capability for health functioning, not according to
their ethnicity, how much money they have, where they live, whether
they are married, or what they do for a living.
An equitable health system requires financial protection of all indi-
viduals, especially the poor and most disadvantaged, against the mone-
tary burdens associated with health risks. Pooling risks and collecting
prepayments unrelated to health status or use secures this protection.
Thus, provision of health-care rests on community rating and not on indi-
viduals' health status.
Maximizing the amount of resources available for health care im-
proves the ability to meet individuals' health needs. At the same time,
health-care financing must be efficient in any country adopting universal
coverage because limited resources must be used wisely and wasted re-
sources prevent important health needs from being met. To achieve both
administrative and technical efficiency, 276 the costs of collecting and dis-
tributing revenue should be minimized, as should loss of funds to corrup-
tion and fraud as discussed below.
276 For a useful discussion of administrative and technical efficiency, see Anne J. Mills &
M. Kent Ranson, The Design of Health Systems, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH: Dis-
EASES, PROGRAMS, SYSTEMS, AND POLICIES (Michael H. Merson et al. eds., 2001).
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2. Gains in Well-Being from Risk Pooling and Health Insurance
A critical area of equitable and efficient health-system financing is
the extent of gains in well-being that can accrue from risk pooling.
Health risks and the financial costs associated with them are difficult to
predict, and even predictable ones are difficult for individuals to plan for
and cover financially. Efforts to predict future health care use patterns
and costs have found that between 50% and 85% of individual healthcare
use is unpredictable, even given a complete set of predictive variables. 277
People without health insurance might not have the financial resources to
pay for treatment.
Collective arrangements for funding health care, such as health in-
surance, can protect individuals from financial loss when adverse health
events occur. Individual risk is reduced by pooling a large number of
people. The larger the risk pool, the more precisely insurers can predict
the probability of financial loss due to illness; therefore, insurers can plan
for and spread risk. Health financing mechanisms differ in their effects
on equity and efficiency.
3. Empirical Evidence on the Equity of Health Financing
Models
With the exception of the United States, nearly all higher-income
market-oriented economies have institutionalized universal healthcare
coverage for their populations. However, the equity of financing these
schemes differs by country. In a study of ten OECD countries (United
States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, It-
aly, Ireland, France, and Denmark), researchers analyzed the percentage
of funding from four general types of healthcare funding: taxation, social
insurance, private insurance, and out-of-pocket payments. 278 Using this
information to compare the overall progressivity of a country's financing
system, they found that countries that publicly finance the majority of
their healthcare expenditures with either tax-financed systems (Denmark,
Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) or social insurance funds
(France, the Netherlands, and Spain), and that raise most of their funds
through progressive taxation were typically more progressive. Percent-
ages of funding from direct taxes were: Denmark, 49.4%; United King-
dom, 38.3%; Ireland, 28.5%, Portugal, 20.4%. General revenue taxation
277 See Dana G. Safran, Adjusting Capitation Rates Under Managed Competition, Pre-
pared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (1993) (citing results
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) and the RAND/New England Medical
Center Medical Outcomes Study (MOS)). Independent variables include disease profiles,
functional status, prior utilization patterns in addition to age, income, education, race, and
gender.
278 See generally INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 36.
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was found to be a progressive means of raising revenue, although the
degree of equity depended on the progressivity and mix of taxes in a
given system. Denmark's relatively high percentage of indirect taxes
(35.8%) made it slightly less progressive overall than the other three
countries. Italy, with 42.3% of taxed-based funding, 37.7% of social in-
surance-based funding, and 20% of out-of-pocket payments, was slightly
less progressive overall than Denmark, and the next two countries, the
Netherlands, and Spain, due in part to its relatively high percentage of
out-of-pocket expenditures.2 79
The study also found that social insurance was a more regressive
method of raising health-care revenue when contributions are capped, as
happens with U.S. Medicare payments, where marginal rates of contribu-
tion decline as income increases. France, the Netherlands, and Spain
have a high proportion of healthcare financing through social insurance:
75.5%, 65.7%, and 61.7% respectively. Each country also uses a low
percentage of total taxes for funding: 2.3%, 6.6%, and 14.0%, respec-
tively. One progressive aspect of social insurance schemes is that they
typically exempt certain groups, such as the elderly and very poor.
The study found private insurance and out-of-pocket payments even
more regressive than social insurance because the former are not neces-
sarily based on earnings. Out-of-pocket payments are even more regres-
sive because they are not typically income-adjusted and because the poor
typically have greater rates of illness than the more affluent. Among
OECD countries, the United States and Switzerland have the highest per-
centages of payments from private sources, at 55.9% and 59.5%, respec-
tively. Switzerland has a slightly higher percentage of payments from
direct taxes (31.6%) and a slightly lower percentage of out-of-pocket
payments (18.6%) than the United States, which gets 23.1% of funding
from direct taxes and roughly 29.6% from out-of-pocket expenditures. A
study in South Korea found that out-of-pocket payments were dispropor-
tionately shouldered by those in the lowest socioeconomic groups and
those with the most severe chronic conditions.280
When out-of-pocket expenditures, low levels of prepayment, and re-
gressively financed prepayments coexist, the poor suffer the most be-
cause their share of prepayments and their out-of-pocket expenditures
are disproportionately high. In a health system, like the United States',
that fails to protect everyone, some families and individuals will slide
into poverty because they must purchase necessary health care without
assistance or forgo medical care they cannot afford.
279 Id.
280 Jennifer Ptah Ruger and Hak-Ju Kim, Out-of-Pocket Health-Care Spending by the
Poor and Chronically Ill in the Republic of Korea, AMERICAN J. PUB. HEALTH (in press).
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4. Market Failures, Public Goods, and the Role of the Public
Sector
Health-care financing, delivery, and organization can involve either
private or public entities or a mix of the two. On this view, society must
compare the advantages and disadvantages of the free market with those
of the government and other political and social institutions. This view
differs from efforts to herald a foremost role for either capitalist or so-
cialist tenets. 28 1 In the case of information technology, for example, the
public sector created the Internet as a military communication tool, but
the free market increased productivity and made the technology accessi-
ble to consumers. In the health-care sector, numerous market failures
have created a rationale for public sector involvement.
Externalities are one of the most common causes of health care mar-
ket failure. 282 When social benefits accruing from a given activity exceed
individual benefits, insufficient investment or consumption by individu-
als results. Immunization and treatment for communicable diseases are
two examples. In these cases, public financing and public-based delivery
are likely necessary to achieve socially desirable ends. Public goods-
those whose benefits should obtain for everyone and whose consumption
by one person does not preclude consumption by another-also require
public financing, because private markets typically will not produce
goods they cannot sell exclusively to one person. Such goods include
clean air and water, sanitation systems, medical research and knowledge,
environmental health, epidemiology, health information, communication
and promotion activities. There are also mixed goods that benefit spe-
cific individuals but have societal benefits as well. Rehabilitation ser-
vices, for example, improve patients' physical functioning but also
enhance economic progress through better labor productivity.
Another market failure in health care is information asymmetry,
when health providers or insurers have significantly more information
about a patient's condition than the patient does or vice versa. Although
providers typically make decisions that are in their patients' best inter-
ests, self-interest sometimes plays a role. In recent years especially, eco-
nomic incentives offered by managed-care companies have challenged
physicians' ability to act on their patients' behalf. And even if the inter-
ests of patients and doctors are perfectly aligned, asymmetric information
281 See generally Solomon R. Benatar, Abdullah S. Daar, Peter A. Singer, Global Health
Challenges: The Need for an Expanded Discourse on Bioethics, R. PLOS Medicine 143
(2005); Thomas Pogge, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Fatal Indifference: The G8 Africa and Global Health 26 J. PUBLIC HEALTH POL. 377-
382 (2005).
282 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. EcON. &
STAT. 387, 389 (1954).
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denies patients the ability to make decisions entirely independently. In-
deed, information symmetry might never be possible, given that doctors
have many years of medical training and patients do not. Buying a medi-
cal consultation is hardly equivalent to the purchase of other marketable
products such as clothing, cars, or furniture.
The uncertain nature of health care 283 - the unpredictability of ill-
ness, and the impact and cost of treatment - makes risk-reduction mea-
sures such as health insurance appealing. However, insurance market
failures, credit shortages, and information insufficiencies can undermine
the economic benefits insurance should provide.
Finally, market failures such as adverse selection and moral hazard
inhibit the efficient functioning of private health-insurance markets.
Moral hazards occur when individuals who are insured and therefore do
not pay the full cost of medical care have less financial incentive to avoid
either poor health or high-cost services. Therefore, insulating people
from the true costs of medical care through insurance might actually in-
crease risky behavior and the probability of an insurance-covered health
event. An obvious counterargument is that the risk of ill health itself is
the most important deterrent to risky behavior. Efforts to mitigate the
effects of moral hazard have included economic measures that sensitize
patients to the real costs of medical care. However, they have had lim-
ited success.
Adverse selection can also create market failures. In both private
and social insurance systems, adverse selection means sicker-than-aver-
age individuals self-select into insurance plans that offer superior health
benefits. This raises the average cost of premiums, causing healthier pa-
tients to leave the plan and obtain less expensive coverage elsewhere.
Private insurers attempt to reduce adverse selection by excluding preex-
isting conditions that will be costly at some future date, requiring medi-
cal exams, excluding high-risk individuals, and instituting waiting
periods for insured care. 284 These measures typically increase the profits
of private insurers but increase societal risk-pooling problems.
Moral hazard and adverse selection require public action such as
regulation of private insurers and mandatory public insurance with risk
pools that include both healthy and sick and both wealthy and poor
contributors.
283 Uncertainty, supra note 143.
284 A 1995 study found that on average HMOs enrolled younger (and thus healthier)
members than traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plans. The study also found a lower percentage
of enrollees with chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease among
HMOs as compared to FFS plans. See Annette K. Taylor et al., Who Belongs to HMOs: A
Comparison of Fee-for-Service versus HMO Enrollees, 52(3) MEDICAL CARE RESEARCH AND
REvIEw 389 (1995).
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In summary, every type of health system has its advantages and
disadvantages in terms of efficiency and equity. The drawbacks of an
entirely public health sector or an entirely private health sector suggest
that mixed public-private systems might be optimal. Market failure
types suggest a greater role for public financing and private provision
through non-profit institutions. This blended approach is espoused by a
capability and health account due to its emphasis on an integrated and
multifaceted system, in which different types of institutions, namely the
free market and the government, reinforce each other to improve health
capability. 2 85 To create and maintain equitable and efficient health sys-
tems, governments must offer significant direction, regulation, financing,
and, in some cases, provision of care. In many settings, however, the
private sector provides goods and services in conjunction with a support-
ive and regulatory public sector. Health sector market failures suggest a
strong and continued role for public intervention. In virtually every area
of the health sector, especially in generating medical knowledge, tech-
niques, goods, and services, public-private collaboration and investment
are critical.
C. ALLOCATING RESOURCES: A JOINT SCIENTIFIC AND DELIBERATIVE
APPROACH
This Article now turns to the question of determining priorities for
competing needs when resources are scarce. It begins with the broader
societal perspective because fair decisions must balance spending on
health with spending elsewhere. It then works inward to prioritize com-
peting claims within the health budget.
1. Reasoned Consensus Through Scientific and Deliberative
Processes
The ethic proposed here involves a joint scientific and deliberative
process, integrating substantive and procedural principles, as a resource
allocation framework. This public process combines the evidence base
of medicine and public health with input from individuals and physician
and public health experts to assess the value of treatments, medications
and other health care and public health interventions. Under this view,
health care and public health are special (and therefore socially guaran-
teed) because they play a dominant role among determinants of health
capability. Consequently, it is important to assess both the necessity and
the appropriateness of a health intervention.
285 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Global Tobacco Control: An Integrated Approach to Global
Health Policy, 48(2) DEVELOPMENT 65, 65-69 (2005).
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Although individuals have primary authority for healthcare deci-
sions that affect them directly, physicians can help determine "medical
appropriateness" and "medical necessity." Thus, individuals employ
their health agency and physicians, by virtue of their medical expertise
and allegiance to the Hippocratic oath, seek their patients' best interest.
In this framework, physician-experts share expert knowledge and re-
sources (e.g. benefits, risks, costs) with each other and with patients to
achieve ethical rationality and practical reasonableness; balancing techni-
cal (or engineering) rationality with ethical rationality in collective
choice.
This process emphasizes deliberatively derived public policy for
human flourishing and reasoned consensus to evaluate arrangements for
improving human functioning. Aristotle emphasized the need for delib-
erative decision-making based on prudence and practical wisdom about
how to insure the good of human life. 286 Indeed, he purported that
medicine was an appropriate object of deliberation and he also recog-
nized the need for both ethical and engineering forms of reasoning. 287 A
more expansive account of rationality incorporates both.
Such deliberations help guide the allocation of health resources and
facilitate the development of health policy and health laws through what
is here called shared health governance. This view contrasts with the
notion that consumers alone, physicians alone, public health experts
alone, strict algorithms, cost-benefit calculations, fair procedures, gov-
ernment officials or technocrats, shared decision making within an in-
formed consent model, or third parties such as insurers should make
health spending decisions. While it endorses many of the principles of
the shared decision making approach to individual medical treatment de-
cisions, it focuses differently on shared health governance, a paradigm in
which individuals, providers and institutions work together to empower
individuals and create an enabling environment for all to be healthy. It
also contrasts with both a strictly technocratic or engineering approach
and a strictly procedural approach to collective choice. It differs from
efforts to develop a decision-making process "to set fair limits to health
care" 288 as it promotes consensus on substantive--especially scien-
tific-principles of distribution. It also offers a method for achieving
consensus (incompletely theorized agreements or ITA) that differs from
aggregative tools such as a strict majority vote. It empowers individuals
through health agency. And its judgments place special importance on
the results and scientific-basis of health policies (costs and
effectiveness).
286 NICOMACHEAN ETHics, supra note 12, at 89.
287 Id. at 35.
288 SETTING LLMrrs FAIRLY, supra note 8, at 2.
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Finally, it promotes public deliberation through a "collaborative
comprehension of problems and remedies"'289 among physician and pub-
lic health experts and citizens. These formulations focus especially on
reasoning - whether at higher levels of abstraction or lower levels of
particulars - and on mutual respect among citizens and experts. This
framework integrates both consequential and procedural elements of jus-
tice. Allocation theories resting on procedural justice alone view ration-
ing decisions as "just" or "right" if such "decisions are the results of fair
procedures. '290
This approach stresses that participatory decision-making is instru-
mentally important for forming values and setting priorities when policy
choices are difficult.2 91 Sen observes that "informed and unregimented
formation of our values requires openness of communication and argu-
ments,"2 92 and that "we cannot, in general, take preferences as given in-
dependently of public discussion. '293 In addition, participatory decision-
making has a constructive role because a critical understanding of health
and social needs requires "discussion and exchange. '294 This approach
is particularly "concerned with the agency role of the individual as a
member of the public .. -295 Agency is important for public policy
because it gives members of the public a role in political, social and
economic choice. Participation and open dialogue are especially impor-
tant for the health-politics nexus. 296
When policies and law require even greater specification, further
iterations of public discussions could be necessary to make difficult
choices about which health services merit societal investment. Public
policy cannot result from narrow technical blueprints. Rather, this para-
digm purports that it should emerge from a stepwise process that reviews
scientific evidence of the consequences of polices on health. If evidence
is incomplete or inconsistent, recommendations should reflect the judg-
ment of individuals and experts. The deliberative process should also
update its recommendations continually to account for changes in medi-
cal knowledge, technology, and costs when determining what probability
of success would make an intervention worthwhile. Ethical rules should
then be modified in the presence of new circumstance. Because these
recommendations form the basis for defining a benefits package, making
289 See FREEDOM, supra note 16, at 31.
290 Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19, at 13.
291 See FREEDOM, supra note 16, at 152.
292 Id at 152.
293 Id. at 153.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 19.
296 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS,
BRIT. MED. J. 331 (2005); Democracy and Health, supra note 242.
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resource allocation decisions, and constructing general guidelines, the
underlying reasoning should be explicit and public. An appeals mecha-
nism for reevaluating decisions is also important.
Public policy should promote objectives as efficiently as possible.
Therefore, some limits must apply when allocating resources and evalu-
ating medical technologies, and allocation decisions must consider cost.
For efficiency evaluation, cost-minimization analysis (CMA) is an inval-
uable tool for decision-making. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) can
also play a role by comparing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of
two or more interventions for a single condition or population, such as
AIDS patients. It contrasts with utilitarian aggregation methodology and
the use of utilities. Instead, it recommends the use of CMA and CEA in
a stepwise manner in which economic considerations follow clinical in-
put, not vice versa. It contrasts with methodologies to incorporate equity
or deliberatively determined weights into CEA.
2. Frameworks for Combining Technical and Ethical Rationality
for Collective Choice
Aristotle and Sen provide little guidance on how technical and ethi-
cal rationalities might be combined in a collective choice framework.
Indeed the precise combination will vary depending on the scope and
nature of the social choice exercise. For example, broader decision mak-
ing at the national level requires participation by popularly representative
groups (e.g. legislatures or councils) and entails trade-offs between
health and other social policies, while decision making about a benefits
package focuses more on broad categories of health care and public
health to meet individuals' health needs. By contrast, more specific
treatment decisions engage patients and providers at the local level. This
Article's scope does not extend to specifying procedures for various cir-
cumstances; however, the following sections will emphasize certain sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the process and discuss how they are
combined. This approach emphasizes including both clinical and eco-
nomic analysis for evidenced-based decision making. These key scien-
tific components of a framework are outlined below. Deliberative
components to the process build on existing literature, but move beyond
that work by integrating deliberation with technical rationality and aug-
menting it with efforts toward incomplete theorization and partial order-
ing in order to come to consensus amidst pluralism and wide
disagreement.
3. Allocations within the Broader Social Budget
In a broader resource allocation exercise, health capabilities com-
pare with other capabilities. The capability approach offers the entire
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capability set as the focal variable for decisions about macro resource
allocation. Although a thorough analysis of partitioning is beyond this
Article's scope, it is important to note that macro-level decisions belong
within the context of a political unit. Under this approach, the decision-
making process would be an open, deliberative, and democratic pro-
cess29 7 that divides the overall budget and legislation into allocations for
the health sector as well as other sectors of society, such as education,
housing, culture, defense, etc. In the United States, the federal govern-
ment achieves this budget through an interactive process between the
legislative and executive branches, 298 but this process is typically ex-
tended and contentious; indeed, the government has been known to shut
down on occasion because it could not agree on a budget. Reform efforts
around specific legislation, universal coverage for example, exemplify
lawmaking efforts in this regard. 299
Empirical evidence on national budgets reveals that countries tend
to devote more resources and increasing shares of their national income
to the health sector as their income increases. 300 Lower-income coun-
tries on average spend less per capita on health in terms of both percent-
age of GDP and actual dollars. 30' In the late 1990's, for example, low-
income countries spent an average of US $21 per capita on health, com-
pared with US $116 for middle-income countries and US $2,736 for
high-income countries. 302 In the poorest countries, per capita health
spending can be as low as US $2 or $3 per capita, with most funds com-
ing from private sources. In terms of percentage of GDP, low-income
countries spend roughly 4.3% on health, middle-income countries 5.9%,
and high-income countries 10.2%.30 3 The public share of health expend-
itures, as a percentage of total health spending in 1999, was 62% (or
6.9% of GDP) in high-income countries, 52% (or 4.3% of GDP) in mid-
dle-income countries, and 27% (or 1.5% of GDP) in low-income coun-
tries. One study found that the public portion of health expenditures will
increase by 1.96% for every 1% increase in per capita income in middle-
297 The specific details of such a deliberative political process are not critical for the
current proposal.
298 See generally Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and
Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 369-90 (1995) (arguing for the use of tech-
niques such as cost-per-life saved or cost-per-QALY gained when setting budget priorities
among different public measures in different policy domains). See also STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (advocating for
the use of a cost-per-life saved methodology to analyze government regulations).
299 See generally Normative Theory, supra note 232.
300 Jennifer Prah Ruger et al., Health and the Economy, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
HEALTH: DISEASES, PROGRAMS, SYSTEMS, AND POLICIES 617 (Michael H. Merson et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Health and the Economy].
301 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, 92 (2000).
302 Id.
303 Id.
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and high-income countries and by 1.08% for every 1% increase in per
capita income in lower-income countries. 30 4
Health-system efficiency determines the extent to which better
health is achieved with a given level of resources. While it is critical to
allocate more national resources to the health sector,30 5 efficient alloca-
tion of these resources within the health system is critical as well. Effi-
cient allocation avoids excessive administrative costs, unnecessary
procedures, and allocative and technical inefficiencies. It effectively re-
alizes the economic benefits of risk sharing.Efficient allocation also re-
quires generating resources to finance health systems efficiently and
equitably (discussed above). Thus, incentives or disincentives associated
with taxation, financing, and insurance policies need close scrutiny. 30 6
4. Allocating Within the Health Policy Budget: Benefits
Package: Types of Goods and Services Guaranteed
What health goods and services should constitute a standard bene-
fits package guaranteed to all? A major ethical issue in health resource
allocation involves guidance about our social obligation to provide ac-
cess to a standard benefits package of goods and services.
I have already argued that all covered goods and services must be of
high quality. This principle addresses the significant inequities that occur
when individuals might have equal claim to particular goods and services
but in practice receive care of significantly different quality.
Second, a high quality allocation scheme guarantees equitable ac-
cess to both prevention and treatment. Third, as discussed above, it guar-
antees equitably financed health insurance that covers this guaranteed
benefits package. A final aspect of this approach leaves open the ability
to define the benefits package more broadly through a public process and
allows individuals to purchase additional health care on the free market.
However, the government would regulate the emergence, development,
and functioning of private health insurance and health care.
Under this approach, goods and services that are "medically appro-
priate" (a term that encompasses medical necessity) 30 7 to ensure central
health capabilities would form the basis of a guaranteed benefits pack-
age. Elsewhere, I analyze an incompletely theorized agreement on core
dimensions of health for use in resource allocation. 30 8 Society could
304 See generally George Schieber & Akiko Maeda, A curmudgeon's guide to financing
health care in developing countries, in G. Schieber (Ed.) Innovations in health care financing.
Proceedings from a World Bank Conference, March 10-11, 1997.
305 A major theme of The World Health Organization's Macroeconomics and Health
Commission.
306 See generally Health and the Economy, supra note 300.
307 Concerns with the concept of "medical necessity" are discussed below.
308 See Right to Health, supra note 22; ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE supra note 15.
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then expand the package through reasoned consensus on an iterative ba-
sis if so desired. Thus, the government-guaranteed benefits package
would cover appropriate and necessary care to prevent, diagnose, or treat
illness, disease, injury, disability, or other medical conditions associated
with escapable morbidity or premature mortality.
A major difference between this account compared to other views,
is the requirement that goods and services be "medically appropriate" as
well as medically necessary. They would have to be consistent with high
quality standards of good medical practice in the relevant country. 30 9
Adding medical appropriateness and established evidence-based clinical
practice guidelines to the medical necessity standard introduces another
level of prioritization grounded in scientifically based, publicly accepted
methods of medicine, public health and health policy. This account
gives authority back to physicians and patients, allowing them to make
informed judgments about resource allocation on a category-by-category
and case-by-case basis. Where medicine is more art than science,
clinical judgment is critical to decision making. However, utilization re-
views, appeal procedures, and evidence-based guidelines should inform
the decision-making process continuously and help hold physicians ac-
countable for their decisions. 310
Applying these additional standards to the prioritization process im-
proves the prospect of acceptable outcomes that are both substantive and
legitimized by a fair and evidence-based procedure. By contrast, at-
tempts to agree on abstract moral principles alone are likely to fail.311 In
practice, individuals often make medical decisions quickly, and members
of society frequently reach agreement on a particular course of action,
whether or not they agree on the underlying justification. 312
5. Medical Appropriateness and Clinical Practice Guidelines
Not all health care is medically necessary and medically appropri-
ate. A lot of what health care has to offer, particularly in the modem day
of advanced medical technology, is only marginally effective (e.g. ex-
tending life for a few weeks or months or a very low probability (<5%-
309 This excludes goods and services that are for the personal comfort, convenience or
custodial care of the patient, family or provider.
310 It is also important to have safeguards in place to counter, ameliorate, or suppress
physician behavior due, for example, to immediate financial gain (e.g., when compensation
associates with degree of utilization) or defensive medicine (e.g., to avoid personal malpractice
lawsuits and thus higher insurance premiums).
311 The problem of moral disagreement on resource allocation issues is widely discussed.
See Rationing Medical Care, supra note 60, and HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82.
312 See generally ARISTOTELAN JUSTICE, supra note 15, individuals rarely are able to
completely theorize a decision when plural and ambiguous concepts and values are involved.
This difficulty is exacerbated on a collective level; people rarely agree on all aspects and at all
theoretical levels of a particular solution.
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10%) of success). Moreover, while millions of people in the world have
received high-quality health care, many others experience underuse,
overuse, misuse, or variations in health care. Some have estimated that
up to 30% of all health care in the United States is wasted and could be
reduced through greater efficiency in clinical practice. 313 Although eco-
nomic approaches have been implemented to address this problem, stud-
ies demonstrate that these non-clinical solutions alter the distribution of
both necessary and unnecessary medical care, creating additional health
problems. Well-established, evidenced-based clinical guidelines can be
helpful 3 14 because they systematically bring together experience and evi-
dence on various conditions and provide recommendations for treatment.
They are continually updated and improved based on new medical
information.
The process of developing clinical guidelines is quite involved.315
Guideline architects search, review, and synthesize extensive amounts of
literature to evaluate empirical evidence and significant outcomes. Peer
and field reviewers subsequently evaluate the validity, reliability, and
utility of the guidelines, and solicit input from practitioners and patients.
When evidence is incomplete or inconsistent, reviewers seek the profes-
sional judgment of an expert panel. 316 In practice, however, these guide-
line recommendations may not be appropriate for all circumstances. 317
While effective in recommending evidence-based care, however,
clinical guidelines alone cannot reduce differences in health care quality,
nor can they evaluate medical technologies, they must be embedded in
broader efforts involving physicians and patients in shared governance
through the assessment of medically appropriate and medically necessary
313 Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N. Lohr, Will We Need to Ration Effective Health Care?,
3 ISSUES ScI. & TECH. 68, 68-77 (1986) [hereinafter Effective Health Care].
314 One study of the use of cervical spine x-rays in patients with blunt trauma found that
physicians could reduce unnecessary x-rays by using five clinical criteria. See Jerome R.
Hoffman et al., Validity of a Set of Clinical Criteria to Rule Out Injury to the Cervical Spine in
Patients with Blunt Trauma, 343(2) NEW ENG. J. MED. 94, 94-99 (2000).
315 A number of medical subspecialties have established evidence-based clinical guide-
lines from extensive meta-analysis of existing studies. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HumtAN SERVICES, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE: TREATING TOBACCO USE AND DEPENDENCE
(2000), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/tobacco/treating-tobacco-use.pdf.
316 For example, see guidelines for: (1) screening for pre-eclampsia; (2) vaginal birth after
cesarean (VBAC); (3) immunizations and chemoprophylaxis; and hundreds more from the
National Guideline Clearinghouse available at http://www.guideline.gov/.
317 Clinical guidelines must be continuously tested and updated. A review of guidelines
for obtaining histopathologic diagnosis on tonsillectomy and/or adenoidectomy specimens
found new evidence suggesting that this diagnosis may not be necessary in this sub-population
of children. See Ramzi T. Younis et al., Evaluation of the Utility and Cost-Effectiveness of
Obtaining Histopathologic Diagnosis on All Routine Tonsillectomy Specimens, 111 LARYNGO-
SCOPE 2166-69 (2001).
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care. 31 8 At least one model of such a system exists: the RAND/UCLA
appropriateness method.3 19
This method combines expert judgment with scientific evidence to
develop procedures for measuring the appropriateness of medical care.
Patients have input after physicians assess an intervention's clinical ef-
fectiveness. Its purpose is to improve health status by reducing overuse
and underuse of care. The method is transparent, scientific, and delibera-
tive and it requires medical specialists to agree on medical guidelines,
with input from patients. Once courses of action are established, ad-
vanced medical information systems help physicians, patients, insurers,
and health planners improve medical decision making at the point of
health-care delivery and for policy.
Since 1986, more than thirty studies in the United States have used
the RAND/UCLA appropriateness method to rate the appropriateness of
clinical procedures such as coronary angiography, coronary artery bypass
surgery, coronary angioplasty, carotid endarterectomy, colonoscopy, up-
per gastrointestinal endoscopy, cataract surgery, hysterectomy, cholecys-
tectomy and other procedures. The resulting literature suggests that the
percentage of inappropriate use across procedures ranges from 2.4% to
75%, while the percentage of appropriate care ranges from 35% to 91%,
318 There is considerable data on clinical outcomes of health interventions. The Federal
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), for example, focuses on research on
clinical effectiveness and has created practice guidelines that offer standardized treatment pro-
tocols for certain conditions. The American Medical Association and the American College of
Cardiology have also endorsed the practice guidelines approach. Some individuals have pro-
moted the idea of combining clinical outcomes with health status evaluations and costs (in
CEA) for rationing purposes. See, e.g., Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108; Medical
Practices, supra note 3. See generally HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 5.
319 The method involves a diversity of factors and 9 stages: (1) procedure selection; (2)
literature search; (3) creation of indication lists; (4) panel selection; (5) rating; (6) measure-
ment scale development; (7) data analysis of appropriateness; (8) necessity assessment; and (9)
reliability and validity tests. In the initial stages, the research team uses three selection crite-
ria: the procedures must be (a) frequently used; (b) associated with much morbidity and/or
mortality (risks and benefits, likelihood of success, quantity and quality of life improvements);
and (c) found to consume considerable resources. Some examples of procedures that meet
these criteria include: coronary angiography, coronary artery bypass surgery, coronary angi-
oplasty, carotid endarterectomy, colonoscopy, upper gastrointestinal endoscopy, cataract sur-
gery, hysterectomy, and cholecystectomy. Once the procedures are selected, the research team
assembles a multispecialty panel and conducts a literature search to collect data on the effi-
cacy, utilization, complications, cost, and stated indications for the procedure of interest. These
data are used to develop a list of indications that categorize patients by symptoms, past medi-
cal history, and results of previous diagnostic tests. These clinically homogeneous groupings
are used to triage patients who present symptoms. The multispecialty panel rates the indica-
tions' appropriateness on a scale from 1 to 9 (9-very appropriate to 1-very inappropriate). By
definition, an indication is deemed medically appropriate if the expected medical benefit to the
patient, in terms of life expectancy and health-related quality of life, exceeds the expected
health risks. The procedure's cost is not incorporated in the appropriateness ranking. See Rob-
ert H. Brook, The Rand/UCLA Appropriateness Method, in CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE
DEVELOPMENT (Kathleen A. McCormick et al. eds., 1994).
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and the percentage of equivocal use ranges from 7% to 32%. For exam-
ple, a study of carotid endarterectomy performed on 1,302 Medicare pa-
tients in three geographic areas of the United States found that roughly
35% were appropriate, 32% were equivocal, and 32% were inappropri-
ate. This procedure was found to be used unnecessarily in one out of
three cases.320 A study of non-emergency, non-oncological hysterecto-
mies performed in seven managed care organizations over a one-year
period deemed roughly 16% of the procedures inappropriate. 321 A 1990
study of 1,338 patients undergoing isolated coronary artery bypass graft
surgery in fifteen different New York State hospitals judged only 2.4%
inappropriate, 91% appropriate, and 7% equivocal. 322 Finally, a study of
the appropriateness of tympanostomy tube surgery for recurrent acute
otitis media and/or otitis media with effusion found that 41% of 6,611
cases were appropriate while 32% were equivocal and 27% were inap-
propriate.323 This sample demonstrates that the percentage of inappro-
priate care varies by type of procedure, geographic location, health-care
volume, hospital, and other factors. There has been less work on the
costs and determinants of inappropriate care. One study that examined
the overall magnitude of inappropriate use in U.S. health-care suggested
that, for policy purposes, roughly 30% of the procedures studied were
inappropriate.324
Studies of medical care appropriateness can provide some of the
evidence base combined with clinical practice guidelines for assessing
health interventions. 325 Combining these efforts on a category-by-cate-
gory basis, in an iterative fashion, reveals areas of improvement for
processes integrating science-based methodologies, expert clinical judg-
ment, and patient input. Both the medical appropriateness and medically
necessary ratings, along with efforts to develop clinical guidelines com-
bined with patient input offer opportunities for reasoned consensus on
categories of health interventions. Patient input is especially critical for
320 Christine M. Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery
Bypass Surgery, 260(4) JAMA 505, 505-9 (1988). See Christine M. Winslow et al., The Ap-
propriateness of Carotid Endarterectomy, 318(12) NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 721-
7 (1988) (for a study of the appropriateness of coronary artery bypass surgery).
321 Steven J. Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness of Hysterectomy: A Comparison of
Care in Seven Health Plans, 269(18) JAMA 2398, 2398-402 (1993).
322 Lucian L. Leape et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft
Surgery in New York State, 269(5) JAMA 753, 753-60 (1993).
323 Lawrence C. Kleinman et al., The Medical Appropriateness of Tympanostomy Tubes
Proposed for Children Younger than 16 years in the United States, 271(16) JAMA 1250,
1250-5 (1994).
324 Effective Health Care, supra note 313.
325 Work examining rates of surgery in Canada demonstrates the potential of population-
based data both to develop clinical guidelines and to influence physician practice. See Charlyn
Black et al., Using Population-Based Data to Enhance Clinical Practice Guideline Develop-
ment, 37(6 Suppl.) MED. CARE JS254-63 (1999).
2006]
464 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:403
valuing effectiveness criteria in this process as citizens through delibera-
tion and value formation help guide policymakers on the value especially
of marginally effective technologies (where increases in longevity or the
odds of survival are low). Moreover, incomplete theorization allows indi-
viduals to make decisions among disagreement, for example to deny
some interventions that may extend life by a few weeks or months, while
at the same time guarantee interventions that extend life for years. It
allows for agreement where agreement is possible without requiring a
full solution to the tradeoff between small gains for many compared with
large gains for few. This process encompassing reasoned consensus in
conjunction with substantive values of health capabilities can help evalu-
ate the effectiveness of medical care and form deliberative decisions on
guaranteed health care for all. Not all effective medical care will be in-
cluded, but this process combines technical and ethical rationality to
guide policy choice. Over time, these methods will evolve and become a
more accepted part of health care.
At the individual level, however, clinicians must ultimately use their
professional judgment, with input from their patients and with reference
to guidelines, when recommending a course of treatment for specific pa-
tients. Peer review of their behavior will provide clinicians an incentive
to act in accordance with established standards of medicine. For exam-
ple, a study evaluating computerized guidelines for prescribing the pres-
ently overprescribed and costly antibiotic, vancomycin, found that
physicians who followed the vancomycin guidelines reduced their over-
all vancomycin use by 30% compared with physicians who did not have
access to the guidelines. 326 Researchers surmised that these modifica-
tions in physician behavior would decrease costs and increase the appro-
priateness of medical care.327
Before moving on, let me address an obvious concern about the
"medical necessity" concept - that it is subject to bias, error, or uncer-
tainty. It is clear from the literature that both the concept and operation-
alization of medical necessity varies. While some argue that this
variation represents deeper philosophical differences about the goals of
medicine, 328 others believe that the concept is unclear at a more practical
level,329 and still others attribute the divergence to insurance companies'
326 Kaveh G. Shojania et al., Reducing Vancomycin Use Utilizing a Computer Guideline:
Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial, 5 J. Am. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 554, 560
(1998).
327 See id.
328 Id.
329 For example, see Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108; HUMAN LIFE, supra note
82; Allocating Health, supra note 110.
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efforts to reduce costs or control resources. 330 Despite these issues, 33' I
argue that health resource allocation models are unworkable unless they
consider the necessity and appropriateness of medical care. Thus, we
should work towards greater uniformity in clinical diagnosis and treat-
ment. To address these concerns, I propose using the principle of medi-
cal appropriateness and evidence-based clinical practice guidelines along
with the principle of medical necessity. 332 These scientifically based,
publicly accepted methods, combined with clinicians' judgment and pa-
tients' input will help draw the line between what is and is not medically
necessary.
6. Medical Futility3 33 and Setting Limits
Determining the appropriateness of medical care will also help limit
treatment. It will help illuminate specific cases of medical futility, when
330 Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14(4) HEALTH AFFAIRS 180,
180-90 (1995) [hereinafter Do We Need It]; Am. Med. Ass'n, Consortium for Citizens with
Disabilities (CCD), (2001), available at http://www.c-c-d.org/,
331 See Mark V. Pauly, What is Unnecessary Surgery?, 57(1) MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
Q., 95, 95-117 (1979) (providing clarification of the terms); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Ander-
son, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1637-1712
(1992); Do We Need It, supra note 330.
332 The model of medical necessity developed by Stanford University researchers is a
good starting point, but requires additional work. The definition states that "an intervention is
medically necessary if, as recommended by the treating physician and determined by the
health plan's medical director or physician designee, it is (all of the following): (1) a health
intervention for the purpose of treating a medical condition; (2) the most appropriate supply or
level of service, considering potential benefits and harms to patient; (3) known to be effective
in improving health outcomes...; (4) cost-effective for this condition compared to alternative
interventions, including no intervention." See Stanford University Center for Health Policy,
Model Contractual Language for Medical Necessity, at http://www.iha.org/nmppmld.htm (last
visited May 9, 2006). A problem with this definition is the health plan's involvement in medi-
cal necessity determinations. In this paradigm, the model used in the RAND/UCLA appropri-
ateness method provides useful insight.
333 For more on this, see Simon Atkinson et al., Identification of Futility in Intensive
Care, 344 LANCET 1203-6 (1994); Baruch A. Brody & Amir Halevy, Is Futility a Futile
Concept?, 20 J. MED. & PHIL. 123-44 (1995); J. Randall Curtis et al., Use of the Medical
Futility Rationale in Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders, 273 JAMA 124-28 (1995);
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-
Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868-71 (1991); Bernard Lo, Unanswered Questions About
DNR Orders, 265 JAMA 1874-75 (1991); Laura Esserman et al., Potentially Ineffective Care:
A New Outcome to Assess the Limits of Critical Care, 274 JAMA 1544-51 (1995); H. Tristram
Engelhardt & George Khushf, Futile Care for the Critically Ill Patient, 1 CURRENT OPINION IN
CRITICAL CARE 329-33 (1995); Amir Halevy et al., The Low Frequency of Futility in an Adult
Intensive Care Unit Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 100-4 (1996); Amir Halevy &
Baruch A. Brody, A Multi-Institution Collaborative Policy on Medical Futility, 276 JAMA
571-74 (1996); Edmund G. Howe, Discussing Futility, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 91-99 (1994);
Nancy S. Jecker & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, When Families Request that 'Everything
Possible' be Done, 20 J. MED. & PHIL. 145-63 (1995); Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility,
Medical Necessity, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30-35 (1991); Marcia Angell, The Case of
Wanglie: A New Kind of 'Right to Die' Case, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 511-12 (1991); Steven H.
Miles, Informed Demand for 'Nonbeneficial' Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512-
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withholding or withdrawing interventions might be most appropriate, be-
cause it attempts to determine when possible treatments are beyond so-
cial and medical obligations. While the issue of medical futility is
implicit in methods on medical appropriateness and necessity, it is worth
emphasizing again here. Much has been written on the medical futility
concept,334 but in brief, a legitimate process for determining medical care
appropriateness should help physicians, patients, and families determine
when medical care is futile. For example, the Society of Critical Care
Medicine Ethics Task Force (SCCMETF) has come to some consensus
on dealing with treatment issues for critically ill patients. SCCMETF
notes that terminally ill patients may be excluded from an Intensive Care
Unit (ICU) when they have one of three conditions: (1) severe irreversi-
ble brain damage; (2) multiorgan failure; (3) metastatic cancer unrespon-
sive to chemotherapy or radiation therapy. SCCMETF also notes
exclusion of patients who are in a persistent vegetative or permanently
unconscious state. If patients or their families have previously specified
that patients wish to avoid futile care, their wishes should be met (e.g.
through advance directives, Do Not Resuscitate orders, futile care with-
drawal and hospice care orders). 335
7. Universal Benefits Package
If we define a universal benefits package that includes goods and
services that are medically necessary and medically appropriate for ad-
dressing central health capabilities, 336 the goods and services provided
would include public health, health care and health-related social ser-
vices. While this Article does not aim to provide a specific list of goods
and services, some examples of categories of healthcare that are subject
to medical necessity and medical appropriateness assessments include:
Medical goods and services provided by physicians and other
health professionals (e.g., imaging, lab, X-ray, and other diagnos-
15 (1991); Society of Critical Care Medicine Ethics Committee (SCCMEC), Consensus
Statement on the Triage of Critically Ill Patients, 271 JAMA 1200-3 (1994) [hereinafter
Consensus Statement]; Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of
Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276-80 (1990); H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., Rethinking Concepts of
Futility in Critical Care, Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of
Medicine (October 1996), available at http://www.mediscene.com/medpub/futile.html.
334 See, Paul R. Ward, Health Care Rationing: Can We Afford to Ignore Euthanasia?,
HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 32 (Feb. 1997) (discussing the potential cost sav-
ings in the United Kingdom of advance directives, do not resuscitate orders, futile care with-
drawal, and hospice care). See also Stephen Horton, Persistent Vegetative State: What Decides
the Cut-Off Point?, INTENSIVE & CRITICAL CARE NURSING, 12, 40 (1996).
335 See Consensus Statement, supra note 333. See American Thoracic Society, Withhold-
ing and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REv. RESPIRATORY DISEASES 726,
726-28 (1991).
336 See Right to Health, supra note 22, for the analysis of an ITA on core dimensions of
health.
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tic tests; preventive care for both adults and children, including
periodic physical exams and office visits; immunizations and flu
shots; screenings; family planning, and maternity care; therapeutic
treatments (including physical medicine, occupational, and speech
therapy); rehabilitative therapies; hearing and vision services in-
cluding testing, treatment, and supplies; orthopedic and prosthetic
devices; durable medical equipment; medical supplies; home
health services; and educational classes and programs; surgical
and anesthetic goods and services provided by physicians and
other health-care professionals;
" Services provided by hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, clin-
ics, nursing care facilities, home health-care agencies;
" Services for medical emergencies and injuries; ambulance
service;
" Parity with other benefits for mental health and substance abuse
services provided by licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical
social workers, or psychiatric nurses; inpatient visits and intensive
outpatient treatment; and diagnostic tests;
" Prescription drug benefits (e.g., drugs, vitamins and minerals, nu-
tritional supplements, contraceptive drugs and devices); 337
" Dental benefits (e.g., clinical oral evaluations, radiographs, tests
and laboratory exams, preventive care and restorations,
extractions).
Doctors and patients should specify goods and services in particular
cases.
A comparison of elements of a guaranteed benefits package under
this approach with those advocated by other accounts highlights several
important distinctions. First, libertarian and market-based approaches do
not guarantee individuals any health care. Second, fair equality of op-
portunity accounts have been vague in determining a benefits package
and could conceivably include all beneficial health care. 338 The FEO
account also provides little guidance on efficiency or on the question of
which goods and services are medically appropriate. Third, approaches
that rely on a "prudential insurer" to choose a benefits package might or
337 This is also a matter of gender equity. One U.S. study found that women have, on
average, 68% more out-of-pocket health-care expenditures than men, primarily because they
have to pay for contraceptive drugs and devices. WOMEN'S RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTI-
TrUrE (WREI), WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE COSTS AND EXPERIENCES 2 (1994).
338 See JusT HEALTH CARE, supra note 19 (asserting that all health care should be an
isolated social good of special moral importance due to its role in protecting equality of oppor-
tunity). By insulating health care from other social goods, Daniels' account implies that all
forms of health care (even health care that may not be medically appropriate) should be iso-
lated from trade-offs with other social goods. But see HUMAN LIFE, supra note 82, at 123, for a
critical view of Daniels offering "most of what modem medicine has to offer."
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might not provide goods and services that individuals need. Much of the
demand for health care is unpredictable due to the uncertainty of health
need. The account presented here, on the other hand, would guarantee
medically appropriate and necessary health care to reduce shortfall ine-
qualities in individuals' central health capabilities; the process would
eliminate the need for ex ante decisions about coverage. However, this
account gives individuals the freedom to reject benefits or interventions
and applies the cost minimization principle (below) and CEA in specific
situations to achieve given health objectives with the fewest resources.
This account also differs from other perspectives in the way in
which it regards specific categories of goods and services. For example,
it may be more horizontally, although not necessarily more vertically, 339
expansive than some views, as demonstrated, for example, by several
pivotal categories of coverage. First, it would cover nutritional supple-
ments, such as vitamins and minerals for individuals who are or are at
risk of being malnourished because nutritional deficiencies undermine
physical and cognitive capabilities. Prenatal iodine deficiency, for exam-
ple, can cause permanent mental retardation, and chronic iodine defi-
ciency can lead to mild mental impairment among school-aged children
and adults. 340 Micronutrient supplementation for children can especially
alleviate childhood health problems and prevent diseases later in life.34'
Providing iodine and iron to micronutrient-deficient girls can help restore
their cognitive functions to normal levels. 342 Similarly, neurological and
physical impairment, mental retardation, and death can be prevented by
providing low-protein formula (excluding leucine, isoleucine, and valine)
to infants unable to digest certain amino acids because they have Maple
Syrup Urine Disease. 343
Nutritional supplementation during pregnancy benefits fetal devel-
opment. Dietary supplementation of folic acid (vitamin B 9) during the
first trimester of pregnancy significantly reduces the incidence of spina
bifida and other neural tube defects. Thus, folic acid and regular vitamin
339 The account may be more horizontally expansive in the sense that the benefits package
might cover high-quality goods and services for some conditions that other approaches might
not cover. It is not necessarily vertically expansive because it provides limitations on resources
in areas where other approaches may not.
340 Joanne Leslie & Dean T. Jamison, Health and Nutrition Considerations in Education
Planning. Educational Consequences of Health Problems Among School Age Children, 12(3)
FoOD AND NUTRITION BULLETIN 198 (1990).
341 Alok Bhargava, Modelling the Health of Filipino Children, 157(3) J. RoYAL STAT.
SOC'Y, SERIEs A (1994).
342 Id.
343 See Maple Syrup Urine Disease Support Group, available at http://www.MSUD-sup-
port.org; Dawn Falik, A Swab Saves Lives: Doctor Develops Genetic Test to Solve Decades-
Old Mystery Surrounding Death of Mennonite Babies; Maple Syrup Urine Disease, ST. Louis
POST-DIsPATCH, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al.
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supplements for pregnant women should be included in the benefits
package as should vitamin supplements and/or formula for children.
Dental health benefits also distinguish this benefits package. Dental
health is unduly influenced by some acute and chronic conditions. For
example, children with hypohidrotic ectodermal dysplasia (HED) lose or
totally lack teeth,344 often requiring tooth replacement or false teeth to
restore their capability for oral functioning. However, U.S. insurance
companies often refuse to cover dental health. Under this approach,
these and other children and adults would be guaranteed dental health
benefits to ensure their ability for oral functioning.
Third, the account would also cover mental health and substance
abuse services, which would gain parity with other benefits. The main
objective would be to ensure individuals' ability for mental health func-
tioning. The package would cover both episodic and chronic conditions
if they were diagnosed by DSM-IV criteria and treated with scientifically
accepted methods of care.345 Goods and services recommendations
would be determined by principles of medical appropriateness and medi-
cal necessity. For example, a patient presenting with acute depression
would receive antidepressant and/or cognitive therapy, depending upon
the extent and severity of his condition. 346
Fourth, the account would cover family planning, contraceptive and
fertility related goods and services. Other approaches would likely ex-
clude such care, arguing that reproductive capability is beyond the scope
of our obligation. These are but a few examples of elements of this ac-
count that would differ from other approaches.
This account differs from previous interpretations of the capability
approach. Sabin and Daniels, for example, argued that the capability
model would advocate insurance coverage for all personal attributes,
such as shyness or lack of confidence, resilience, and sociability, that put
individuals at a relative disadvantage. They claim that the central pur-
pose of health care under their interpretation of a capability model is to
"use health care to help people become equal competitors, free from dis-
advantageous lack of capabilities regardless of etiology. '34 7 Thus, they
argue, erroneously, that the capability model fails to make a "moral dis-
tinction between treatment of illness and enhancement of disadvanta-
geous personal capabilities. '34 8 By contrast, the capability and health
344 See generally The Sarah Moody Foundation, available at http://www.Sarahmoody
foundation.org/.
345 See generally American Association of Community Psychiatrists (AACP), available
at http://www.communitypsychiatry.org/.
346 Mental health functioning is also linked to health agency as discussed in Agency and
Quality, supra note 23.
347 Medical Necessity, supra note 96, at 10.
348 Id.
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account presented here, defines the central purpose of health care as ad-
dressing shortfall inequalities in health capabilities, rather than all per-
sonal traits, talents, skills, or capabilities unrelated to health.
8. Hard Cases: The "Bottomless Pit Objection" and
"Reasonable Accommodation"
Critics have argued that some ethical theories give insufficient gui-
dance about providing exorbitantly costly services to individuals with
intractable illnesses or injuries. 349 A particularly difficult problem is
what some have called the "bottomless pit objection, ' 350 whereby one or
a few individuals with seemingly infinite needs use significant resources
without improving health functioning. 351 Rawls's maximin or difference
principle 352 and the FEO account 353 have encountered particular criti-
cism 354 for these problems. 355 On the other hand, consequentialist ap-
proaches that favor allocations that produce the greatest net social benefit
are criticized for discriminating against those most in need, especially the
disabled, and for ignoring individuality.3 5 6 These failings, liberal theo-
349 See Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 146, 168 (1981) [hereinafter Distributive Justice]; Decent Minimum, supra note 248;
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, 38 McGWL L.J. 883, 885-87
(1993).
350 See ISSUES IN BIoETHics, supra note 10 (addressing attempts to limit the claims of the
medical needy based on "capacity to benefit"). See also PATIENT SELECTION, supra note 124,
at 192-207, on concerns with this concept and with randomly selecting those who might bene-
fit from a given treatment.
351 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist- Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Jus-
tice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 251 (1973) (criticizing Rawls's theory of justice and noting that some
health-care procedures "serve to keep people barely alive but with little satisfaction and which
are yet so expensive as to reduce the rest of the population to poverty.").
352 Rawls does not apply this principle specifically to health care. See generally THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 21. Others who have applied the principle to health care, however,
note that it could lead to the bottomless pit problem.
353 See Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at 1023-24.
354 See id. at 1024 (noting Daniels' emphasis on priority for those diseases and disabilities
that
"involve a greater curtailment of an individual's share of the normal opportunity
range... could... give rise to the 'bottomless pit' problem of patients whose health
care costs are so high, and whose disabilities are so intractable, that promoting the
normal opportunity range of these patients precludes spending to promote the normal
opportunity range of all other individuals.").
See also Health, and Healthcare, supra note 19, at 2. See generally INEQUALrrY, supra note
1.
355 See Medical Ethics, supra note 194, at 42 (noting that the Daniels approach "does not
tell us which opportunities to protect when scarcity prevents us from equally protecting every-
one's."); Distributive Justice, supra note 349, at 171 (observing that the Daniels "approach
provides little ... [guidance on] hard ...resource allocation decisions in which we must
choose between services which remove serious impairments of opportunity for a few people
and those which remove significant but less serious impairments for many.").
356 See David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting,
268 JAMA 1454, 1454-59 (1992); Dan W. Brock, Priority to the Worse Off in Health Care
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rists argue, violate the Kantian principle of respect for individuals as
moral agents who cannot be used solely to assist other individuals. 35 7
This account also espouses this principle.
So how does society prioritize goods and services to the neediest
but also set limits in order not to jeopardize a society's overall health
achievements? 358 This account addresses these competing claims in sev-
eral stages. First, by prioritizing central health capabilities above non-
central ones and leaving open the selection and valuation of the latter, the
account explicitly prioritizes health care associated with core dimensions
of health and limits others. Second, by using medical necessity, medical
appropriateness and evidence-based clinical guidelines as criteria, the ac-
count further prioritizes those health goods and services deemed medi-
cally appropriate over inappropriate or futile ones. Third, within the
medically appropriate care associated with central health capabilities, the
account prioritizes those goods and services that reduce shortfall inequal-
ities in central health capabilities over those that do not.3 59 Fourth, in
medically appropriate health care that reduces these shortfall inequalities,
the account applies the low-level principle of "reasonable accommoda-
tion" and the related "reasonable adjustments" to illuminate our obliga-
tions. 360 This principle emerged when the United States government had
to interpret the scope of its obligations to individuals with disabilities
Resource Prioritization, in MEDICINE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 362, 362-72 (Rosamond Rhodes et
al. eds., 2002); See generally Prioritizing and Rationing, supra note 57; Paul T. Menzel, Ore-
gon's Denial: Disabilities and Quality of Life, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21,
21-25; See generally Disabilities Act, supra note 9; David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disabil-
ity: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 49, 49-87 (1996) [hereinafter Destructuring Disability] (arguing that the quality ad-
justed life year (QALY) discriminates against the disabled); Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses
and Discrimination: Discriminatory Nontreatment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1581, 1581-667 (1993) (pointing out that disabilities should not be considered if they
do not have a "medical effect" on the proposed treatment). See also United States Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Evaluation of the Oregon Medicaid Proposal 2
(1992) [hereinafter Medicaid Proposal]. (noting that the Bush administration rejected Oregon's
waiver application, partly on the grounds that its use of quality-of-life measures violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). But see generally Rationing Through Choice, supra
note 108.
357 See Allocating Health, supra note 110.
358 Some advocate "random selection" (typically implemented by lottery) as a way to
decide who gets which health resources. See generally BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47;
See generally Disabilities Act, supra note 9; See generally PATIENT SELECTION, supra note 124
(recognizing the potential use of "modified random selection" to allocate scarce treatments
among those who demonstrate a certain ability to benefit (thus excluding those who have not
met that threshold)); See generally Destructuring Disabilities, supra note 356 (arguing that
this threshold should be used only when the difference between those who are likely to benefit
and those who are not is "large" and "certain."). See generally Rationing Medical Care, supra
note 60, for an analysis of the "fair chances vs. best outcomes" rationing problem.
359 See ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE, supra note 15; Right to Health, supra note 22.
360 1 thank Theodore W. Ruger for useful discussions on this topic.
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under the Rehabilitation Act 36 1 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).362 The Acts require programs to make "reasonable accommoda-
tions" or "modifications" so that disabled persons can meet the pro-
gram's "essential eligibility requirements. '363 In general, "reasonable
accommodations or modifications" are those that are not "fundamental"
or will not cause "undue hardship" to the program in question. The Reha-
bilitation Act and the ADA stop short of accommodations that could
cause "undue hardship," determined by the particular accommodation's
nature and cost and the financial and organizational capacity of the insti-
tution in question.364 In the U.K. related legislation in the Disability Dis-
crimination Acts of 1995 and 2005 require "reasonable adjustments" to
remove barriers from disabled individuals' participation.
This account considers absolute harm to others in terms of their ca-
pability for functioning, not a cost-benefit analysis. Several commenta-
tors have criticized the application of a rigid cost-benefit analysis to
interventions on disabled individuals' behalf, on the grounds that such an
allocative principle would discriminate against the disabled, who might
receive less benefit relative to costs than non-disabled individuals. 365
This account recognizes this critique's value and rejects weighing
cost considerations against the precise benefit of an intervention (for ex-
ample, through CBA). It advocates directing resources to those who ex-
perience shortfall inequalities in the central health capabilities in
proportion to their deprivations and the use of medical care necessity and
appropriateness (and medical futility) as a standard for evaluating health
care interventions. In operationalizing these normative principles and al-
locating health resources across society as a whole, however, considering
the absolute costs of certain treatment protocols and their effects on total
health system resources is appropriate (as discussed below) and must be
evaluated in the context of a model of shared health governance between
individuals, physicians and institutions that govern health.
Both the ADA statute itself and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations endorse an approach of considering ab-
solute costs of accommodation as a relevant factor while not engaging in
a direct cost-benefit analysis. The ADA defines undue hardship as "an
361 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1994).
362 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
363 29 U.S.C. § 795 (1994); 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12111-12113 (1994).
364 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994).
365 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Utility, Equality, and Health Care Needs in Persons With
Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILTmS: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 241 (Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). "Primary
reliance on measures of outcome such as increases in length of life ... will disfavor persons
with disabilities. We should not prefer one patient over another just because the first patient
will realize more benefit from the care."
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action requiring significant difficulty or expense. '366 The EEOC regula-
tions assess hardship by considering the "nature and cost" of the accom-
modation and the impact on the "overall financial resources" of the
organization involved.367 But the EEOC guidelines explain that "neither
the statute [the ADA] nor the legislative history supports a cost-benefit
analysis to determine ... undue hardship. 36 8
Even economically minded federal jurists are hesitant to apply strict
cost-benefit analysis to the question of undue hardship in particular
cases. In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,369
Judge Richard Posner states that the costs of accommodation are impor-
tant for determining reasonableness and undue hardship, but that "it
would not follow" from this "that the costs and benefits ... always have
to be quantified, or even that an accommodation would have to be
deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however
slightly. '370 Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Posner seems more
predisposed to cost-benefit analysis, stating that an accommodation
causes undue hardship, and thus is not "reasonable," only if an institution
must "expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improve-
ment in the life of a disabled employee," or where "the costs are exces-
sive in relation to . . . the employer's financial survival or health."
37 1
Extending this argument to the question of intractable conditions and
health resource allocation, two factors would be relevant in defining the
social obligation. The first is medical appropriateness and medical futil-
ity; the second is the point beyond which the allocation sacrifices, unduly
reduces, or otherwise impacts the central health capabilities of others.
Ultimately, the obligation to address intractable needs does not extend
beyond the point where others might suffer harm to their central health
capabilities. At the societal level, resource allocation should focus on all
deprivations in health capabilities below the agreed-upon threshold level
of health functioning. Combining the "reasonable accommodation" stan-
dard with "medical appropriateness" and "medical necessity" principles
could help society clarify its obligations and in a way that obviates the
need to employ concepts such as the "bottomless pit" problem. Existing
case law could reveal the reasoning behind and the application of such a
standard. Eventually, however, a body of case law and policy case stud-
366 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994) (emphasis added).
367 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2004).
368 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS wrrIH DISABILITIES ACT
(2002).
369 Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
370 Id. at 542.
371 See id. at 542-43.
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ies in health resource allocation could develop to offer guidance on deci-
sion making in this area.372
Fifth, as to advance directives and do not resuscitate orders the ac-
count supports efforts to ensure that end-of-life treatment complies with
patients' values. Such compliance should be encouraged because it re-
spects patient autonomy and holds the potential as well to reduce costs
and medically futile care. 373 Studies have shown that patients' end-of-
life treatment preferences are often ignored, 374 resulting in family mem-
bers being two to three times more likely to err by over-treating as by
under-treating. 375 Without the use of advance directives, studies have
found that physicians, like family members, are likely to over-treat their
patients in efforts to do anything possible to preserve life. 376 An analysis
of hospice care found that increased use of advance directives could po-
tentially save between 25% and 40% of health-care costs during the last
month of life, and between 10% and 17% of health-care costs during the
last six months of life. 377
Sixth, this account applies "cost minimization" analysis and, in cer-
tain micro-level comparisons, cost-effectiveness analysis in order to pro-
mote shortfall equality in individuals' capabilities for health with the
fewest resources possible. Cost-minimization studies assume a given ob-
jective and search for the least expensive way to achieve it. At the
micro-level, cost-effectiveness compares the incremental health benefits
and incremental costs of two or more interventions.
9. Joint Clinical and Economic Solutions: Incorporating
Efficiency
Meeting the dual social obligations of equality and efficiency in
health resource allocation will require both clinical and economic solu-
tions, but clinical and medical input must drive the process. This ap-
372 Employing the "reasonable accommodation" principle would involve using an incom-
plete eligibility criterion of medical appropriateness to avoid the "bottomless pit" problem, and
must be done on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274
(1987) (stating that the court "must conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate
findings of fact, based on reasonable medical judgments"); see also Strathie v. Dep't of
Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983), as cited in Rationing Through Choice, supra note 108, at
1094-95 (noting that the determination of whether an individual with a disability poses a
safety threat to others in the workplace must be made on a case-by-case basis).
373 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life. What do the Data Show?,
275(24) JAMA 1907-14 (1996) [hereinafter End of Life].
374 See Peter H. Ditto et al., Advance Directives as Acts of Communication: A Random-
ized Controlled Trial, 161(3) ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 421, 421 (2001).
375 See Kristen M. Coppola et al., Accuracy of Primary Care and Hospital-Based Physi-
cians' Predictions of Elderly Outpatients' Treatment Preferences With and Without Advance
Directives, 161(3) ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 431, 435-36 (2001).
376 Id.
377 See generally End of Life, supra note 373.
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proach ensures that physician judgment (at the bedside and a priori
through clinical guidelines and medical appropriateness assessments) and
patient input are the primary determinants of care. Yet, successful im-
plementation of effective clinical protocols requires economic incentives.
Empirical evidence suggests that economic tools can influence the be-
havior of patients, physicians, and planners.
Several measures have been implemented to encourage cost con-
sciousness and improve efficiency. In the United States, for example,
high and rising health-care costs have produced various economic incen-
tives on both the supply and demand sides to reduce health-care use and
expenditures. On the demand side, instruments such as co-payment
schemes and health insurance deductibles require patients to pay either a
percentage, or a fixed portion, of the price of a given medical procedure
or health premium. The economic rationale behind co-pays and deduct-
ibles is that they sensitize consumers' to the price of health care and thus
serve as a deterrent to consumption.378
On the supply side, price, budgetary, and salary incentives (prospec-
tive and capitated payment schemes, global budgets, competition, 379 and
utilization and management review systems) are all efforts to reduce util-
ization costs. 380 In theory, these incentives force physicians and hospi-
tals to internalize costs and to provide only the most cost-effective care.
In some cases, they actually shift the financial risk of health expenditures
from health insurers to health providers. The increased use of payment
mechanisms (such as Diagnostic-Related Groups) and health financing
and delivery institutions such as managed care organizations (HMOs)
378 Some free-market proponents would completely alter the incentive structure in the
health-care marketplace. To increase the cost consciousness of consumers, some have pro-
posed making families, rather than employers, responsible for purchasing health insurance
through mandates and tax credits. See A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (Stuart M.
Butler & Edmund F. Haislmaier eds., 1989) 58-67; See also Alain Enthoven & R. Kronick, A
Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s. Universal Health Insurance in a System De-
signed to Promote Quality and Economy, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 94-101 (1989) (suggesting
that employees should pay the difference between what their employers paid, e.g., 80% of the
cost of the average premium, and their choice of plan). This would maintain the current em-
ployer-related health insurance system while attempting to increase consumers' cost-
consciousness).
379 In the United Kingdom, National Health Service reforms in the 1990s proposed in-
creasing competition through "internal markets." A review of these reforms, concluded there
was "little evidence from the UK or elsewhere that competition in health care produces effi-
ciency or improvements in resource allocation." See Alan Maynard & Karen Bloor, Universal
Coverage and Cost Control: The United Kingdom National Health Service, 20(4) J. HEALTH
AND HUM. SERVICES ADMIN. 423-438 (1998).
380 Another method used to ration health-care goods and services is the utilization review,
where health insurance companies, including managed care companies, employ panels of ex-
perts to deny approval of physician's treatment decisions. The rationale for this process is
rarely made explicit, but some work suggests that decisions are made on the basis of cost.
2006]
476 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:403
have resulted from these efforts. 381 However, it is unclear whether these
measures have actually reduced expenditures or maintained or improved
effectiveness. 382 For example, DRGs have shifted costs from one system
to another instead of achieving real savings. 383 In the private U.S. health
insurance market, managed care organizations proliferated for some
time. They aim to control costs through pre-approval requirements, co-
payments, and negotiated fees with providers and to cut back on margi-
nal value services through use review, pre-certification, and profiling.
While such strategies may reduce the volume of health-care pro-
vided, they are devoid of clinical input and therefore often reduce both
inappropriate and appropriate care. Thus, they can have deleterious
health consequences and can be inegalitarian; 384 particularly affecting
the poor and medically indigent, who often have the greatest health-care
needs and respond most sensitively to economic incentives to reduce
consumption. 385 Therefore, attempts to reduce shortfall inequalities in
individuals' capabilities for health with the fewest resources possible will
require a joint clinical and economic solution.
381 In the United States in 2000, the HMO penetration rate (including both traditional
HMOs and point-of-service [POS] plans) was roughly 30%, with 20 states having an HMO
penetration rate of 30% or more. In addition, thirty of fifty states gave financial incentives to
providers for withholding covered health care in 2000. See Kaiser Family Foundation, State
Health Facts Online (2001), available at http://statehealthfacts.kff.org (follow "50 State Com-
parisons"; then follow "Managed Health Care and & Health Insurance"; then follow "HMO
Penetration Rate").
382 Both supply- and demand-side approaches to cost containment have advantages and
disadvantages, which can be assessed by whether they: (a) reduce health-care expenditures; (b)
maintain and improve health; and (c) are medically feasible. One of the perceived benefits of
both approaches is a reduction in health-care utilization. In a randomly controlled health insur-
ance experiment, for example, researchers found that increasing co-payments on health insur-
ance reduced demand for health-care services by as much as 40%. See generally JOSEPH P.
NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT
(1993), at 31-180. But the same study found that co-payments did not differentiate between
appropriate and inappropriate care. See John T. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis and Service-Specific Analysis in a Randomized Con-
trolled Trial, 24(9) MED. CARE S1, S31-38 (1986). Additionally, cross-cultural comparisons
of national health systems provide evidence of the effectiveness of capitation and global
budgeting in reducing health care utilization. The U. K. has lower usage rates of various diag-
nostic and treatment options than the United States. One study found that rates of coronary
artery bypass surgery were less than one-fifth as prevalent in the United Kingdom than in the
United States.
See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING Hos-
PITAL CARE 28 (1984).
383 See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PRO-
GRESS (1990).
384 See Paul T. Menzel, Economic Competition in Health Care: A Moral Assessment,
12(1) J. MED. AND PHIL. 73-77(1987) (describing the equity implications of economic compe-
tition, particularly in the form of increased patient cost-sharing and "cream skimming.").
385 See David Mechanic, Socioeconomic Status and Health, in PATHWAYS TO HEALTH:
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL FACTORS 13 (John P. Bunker et al. eds., 1989).
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Under this account, economic solutions should follow and comple-
ment clinical progress, not vice versa. As the evidence on the magnitude
and determinants of inappropriate care accumulates, economists and
health policy analysts can create policy instruments to encourage physi-
cians, patients, and planners towards productive care. Particular attention
should be paid to incentivizing and training physicians by rewarding ap-
propriate care and penalizing inappropriate care. 386 This paradigm uses
an iterative approach, first addressing equity by using clinical input to
analyze deficits in individuals' ability for health functioning below a
given threshold. It then addresses efficiency, using measures of medical
care appropriateness, cost-minimization, and, in specific cases, cost-ef-
fectiveness analysis.
Cost-minimization analysis is an appropriate evaluation to be used
when the case for intervention has been established, 387 and it is increas-
ingly becoming a mainstay of efficiency analysis in public health and
medicine. In obstetrics and gynecology, 388 for example, researchers com-
pared the costs of three alternative hysterectomy methods - abdominal
hysterectomy (AH), vaginal hysterectomy (VH), and laparoscopically as-
sisted vaginal hysterectomy (LAVH) - which have been judged equally
effective. 389 However, the study found that LAVH (at $6,116) was more
costly than either AH (at $5,084) or VH (at $4,221). 390 A study of preg-
nancy management beyond 41 weeks also compared the costs of three
strategies: expectant management (EM), immediate induction of labor
using prostaglandin gel (PGE 2), and elective induction (EI). 3 9 1 All three
strategies were determined to be acceptable approaches to prolonged
pregnancy, but the PGE2 treatment (at $3,312) was approximately 33%
more costly than EM and El, which were equivalent in cost.392
Cost-minimization studies have also been applied to cancer therapy.
Multiple studies compared the costs of peripheral blood progenitor cell
(PBPC) transplantation with those for autologous bone marrow trans-
plantation (ABMT) in patients with Hodgkin's or non-Hodgkin's lym-
386 Incentives should be meritorious and can be either financial or non-financial.
387 See Ray Robinson, Cost-Minimization Analysis, 307 BRIT. MVED. J. 686-89, 726
(1993).
388 See Michael Gardner, Cost Analysis in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 41 CLINICAL OB-
STETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 296 (1998) (discussing different cost analysis used in obstetrics
and gynecology).
389 See James H. Dorsey et al., Costs and Charges Associated with Three Alternative
Techniques of Hysterectomy, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 476 (1996).
390 Id. at 476.
391 Gardner, supra note 388, at 298.
392 Id.
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phoma.393 While studies found both treatments equally effective, 394 two
studies found that ABMT cost roughly $13,600 more than the PBPC in
terms of overall service rates.395 In another cost-minimization study of
cancer therapy, researchers in the United Kingdom compared the combi-
nation chemotherapy known as CHOP (cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin,
vincristine, prednisolone), fludarabine, and rituximab for treating re-
lapsed indolent B cell non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. 396 Similar clinical out-
comes resulted from all three treatments. 397 However, the per patient cost
associated with fludarabine (£10,022) was considerably higher than that
of either CHOP (7,210) or rituximab (E6,080).398
Another area in which cost-minimization has been utilized is ambu-
latory anesthesia. One study compared four protocols: methohexital-
desflurane, methohexital-sevoflurane, propofol-desflurane, and propofol-
sevoflurane. 399 Results showed that when the outcome was induction of
anesthesia, methohexital costs less than propofol.4°° Another study com-
pared two rehabilitation programs for stroke patients: namely, early hos-
pital discharge and home-based rehabilitation with conventional in-
hospital rehabilitation and community care for stroke rehabilitation. 40 1
The average cost per patient was lower for early hospital discharge and
home-based rehabilitation, although the difference in cost was not statis-
393 See generally T.J. Smith et al., Economic Analysis of a Randomized Clinical Trial to
Compare Filgrastim-Mobilized Peripheral-Blood Progenitor-Cell Transplantation and Autol-
ogous Bone Marrow Transplantation in Patients With Hodgkin's and Non-Hodgkin's Lym-
phoma, 15 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5, (1997) (finding that overall resources used and costs
were lower for PBPC than for ABMT); N. Schmitz et al., Randomised Trial of Filgrastim-
Mobilised Peripheral Blood Progenitor Cell Transplantation Versus Autologous Bone-Mar-
row Transplantation in Lymphoma Patients, 347 LANCET 353 (1996).
394 See Smith et al., supra note 393, at 356 (noting that, although not specifically ad-
dressed in the study, there was no obvious difference in the overall survival and disease-free
survival rates of patients receiving PBPC versus AMBT transplantations); Olivier Hartmann et
al., Peripheral Blood Stem Cell and Bone Marrow Transplantation for Solid Tumors and
Lymphomas: Hematologic Recovery and Costs. A Randomized, Controlled Trial., 126 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 600, 606 (1997) (noting that although death and carcinologic events
were not end points, rates of relapse have been similar in both groups).
395 Smith et al., supra note 393, at 8-9; Schmitz et al., supra note 393, at 357.
396 John Sweetenham et al., Cost-Minimization Analysis of CHOP, Fludarabine and Ri-
tuximab for the Treatment of Relapsed Indolent B-cell Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma in the U.K.,
106 BRIT. J. HAEMATOLOGY 47, 48 (1994).
397 See id. at 52 (noting that the response rates of relapsed patients to the three drugs has
been comparable).
398 Id. at 51.
399 See Rui Sun et al., A Cost Comparison of Methohexital and Propofol for Ambulatory
Anesthesia, 89 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 311, 312 (1999).
400 See id. at 314-15.
401 See Craig Anderson et al., Home or Hospital for Stroke Rehabilitation? Results of a
Randomized Controlled Trial II: Cost Minimization Analysis at 6 Months, 31 STRoVE 1032
(2000).
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tically significant. 40 2 The study did incorporate indirect costs incurred
by home-based caregivers.40 3
Cost-minimization analysis has also highlighted potential cost sav-
ings in pharmaceuticals. A 2002 study of the use of prescription drugs
by Medicare patients in the United States estimated that increasing the
use of generic medications would save Medicare's 40 million benefi-
ciaries roughly $14 billion in 2003 and more than $250 billion over a
ten-year period.40 4 The study concluded that the biggest savings would
be achieved by prescribing generic medications for conditions for which
treatments are the most costly, such as ulcers and arthritis.40 5 Moreover,
increased use of generic drugs would save an individual Medicare patient
16.3% or roughly $270 per Medicare patient.40 6 Given the significant
increased drug spending by Medicare patients as compared to younger
adults,40 7 such measures could substantially reduce the cost of a Medi-
care prescription drug benefit. 40 8
More recently, cost-minimization studies have been conducted
cross-nationally. For example, in a study of antiepileptic drugs for newly
diagnosed epilepsy, researchers found that while all four frequently pre-
scribed antiepileptic drugs - lamotrigine (LTG), carbamazepine (CBZ),
phenytoin (PHT), and valproate (VPA) - were equally able to achieve
freedom from seizures, LTG was two to three times more expensive than
the other three drugs in each country. 40 9 An earlier U.K.-based cost-
minimization study concluded that LTG costs more than the three other
drugs. 410
Lastly, cost-minimization has also been used in studies pertaining to
the treatment of HIV. A pilot study by the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) found that cycling antiretroviral treat-
402 Id. at 1035.
403 Id. at 1033-34.
404 Grant A. Ritter et al., Greater Use of Generics: A Prescription for Drug Cost Savings
2 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Schneider Institute for Health Pol-
icy, Brandeis University).
405 See id. at 11; Cindy Parks Thomas et al., Growth In Prescription Drug Spending
Among Insured Elders, 20 HEALTH AFF. 265, 275 (2001).
406 Ritter et al., supra note 404, at 2.
407 See id., at 3 (noting the elderly, who consume roughly three times as many prescrip-
tions as do the younger population, incurred an 18.5 percent increase in drug costs between
1997 and 2000, while younger enrollees only experienced a 16 percent increase); See Cindy
Parks Thomas et al., Growth In Prescription Drug Spending Among Insured Elders, 20
HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 265, 268-70 (2001).
408 Ritter et al., supra note 404, at 13.
409 See D.C. Heaney et al., Cost Minimization Analysis of Antiepileptic Drugs in Newly
Diagnosed Epilepsy in 12 European Countries, 41 EPILEPSIA S37, S43 (2000).
410 See Dominic C. Heaney et al., An Economic Appraisal of Carbamazepine, Lamo-
trigine, Phenytoin and Valproate as Initial Treatment in Adults with Newly Diagnosed Epi-
lepsy, 39 EPILEPSIA S19, S24 (1998).
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ment rather than administering a continuous dose might be as effective,
have fewer side effects and be significantly less expensive.411
This brief summary demonstrates the enormous potential of cost-
minimization studies for reducing costs and inefficiencies in health pol-
icy while avoiding some of the objectionable problems associated with
other economic methodologies. The paradigm presented here differs
from other efforts 412 to address the efficiency-equity tradeoff.413 It uses
an iterative approach and various methodological techniques for assess-
ing the competing claims of equality and efficiency. 41 4 Neither the bene-
fit maximization approach, which values saving life and improving/
extending life equally, nor the strict lexical prioritization of life-saving
and life-extending over all other health benefits is a workable solution to
this problem. For example, the Oregon Health Services Commission
(HSC) abandoned the cost-utility methodology and ranking of condition/
treatment pairs, which had favored relatively minor but inexpensive in-
terventions over more expensive interventions that saved lives.415 The
411 See National Institute of Allergy and Infections Diseases, 7-Day-On, 7-Day-Off Regi-
men Could Reduce Cost, Toxicities of HIV Therapy, available at http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/
news/newsreleases/2001/dayon.htm.
412 For example, Menzel argues that individual consent to cost-effectiveness analysis
should be used as a rationing option. See generally STRONG MEDICINE, supra note 5. Rakow-
ski, however, argues for using hypothetical choice constructs, such as the "veil of ignorance"
when allocating resources because hypothetical consent to rules of distributive justice is simi-
lar to actual consent. See generally EQUAL JUsTICE, supra note 10. This line of reasoning
sounds similar to that used by those working in the areas of contingent valuation and revealed
preference through hedonic measures. Rakowski also notes that individuals making hypotheti-
cal choices about rationing would likely not choose utilitarian approaches to rationing, but
would instead choose random selection, but with a caveat for considering age and prognosis.
See id.
413 On the ethical implications of QALYs, Williams in particular has argued that QALYs
can "accommodate a wide variety of health dimensions and sources of valuation," as well as
"the differential weighting of benefits according to who gets them, so they do not commit their
users to any particular notion of distributive justice." Alan Williams, QALYs and Ethics: A
Health Economist's Perspective, 43 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1795, 1795 (1996). Menzel, however,
argues that the QALY model requires considerable work in meeting moral concerns. See Paul
T. Menzel, QALYs: Maximisation, Distribution and Consent. A Response to Alan Williams, 3
HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 226, 228-29 (1995). For equity-efficiency tradeoffs in HIV preven-
tion see Edward H. Kaplan & Michael H. Merson, Allocating HIV-Prevention Resources: Bal-
ancing Efficiency and Equity, 92 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1905, 1905-07 n. 12 (2002).
414 Nord et al. are finding that individuals tend to emphasize "equality in value of life and
in entitlement to treatment rather than level of health after treatment." Health State, supra note
195, at 37; see The QALY, supra note 196, at 92; Health Benefits, supra note 196, at 1435-36.
Thus, people are reluctant to deny treatment to individuals based on benefit maximization. See
Health Benefits, supra note 196, at 1435. Nord and others propose an approach called "cost-
value analysis," which uses equity weights to incorporate concerns for both severity and poten-
tial health in QALY calculations. See HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 41.
415 See Medicaid Proposal, supra note 356, at 6-7.
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Oregonian public found it unacceptable. 41 6 The HSC commissioners
then ranked seventeen categories of medical interventions according to
community health-care values, 4 17 without including costs. This approach
gave the highest ranking to interventions that would save lives and per-
mit a full recovery. 41 8 Maternity and newborn services ranked second,
saving lives without a full recovery ranked third, and interventions for
fatal or nonfatal conditions that have little effect on quality of life ranked
last.419 The HSC Commissioners then modified the rankings slightly by
introducing costs, although they continued to give priority to life-saving
treatments, despite exorbitant costs in many cases. 420
Although the HSC's approach to revising its rankings is consistent
with the paradigm presented here, it differs in many ways. This ap-
proach proposes that physicians and patients should play a larger role in
determining medical appropriateness and in using evidence-based input
to assess the net effectiveness of health interventions. The problem with
lexical prioritization of life-saving or life-prolonging interventions is that
it is inflexible when assessing the net benefits and costs of specific inter-
ventions on a case-by-base basis.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed an alternative paradigm for addressing the
dual social obligations of equality and efficiency in health ethics, policy
and law. It has offered a resource allocation framework that relies on a
joint scientific and deliberative approach incorporating both clinical and
economic solutions. It recommends that economic solutions follow
clinical input, not vice versa. The result is not a simple formula for an-
swering complex questions but several key substantive and procedural
principles for guiding decision-making. No framework can satisfy all
ethical requirements. This theory aims to provide more equitable poli-
cies and laws that would distribute the benefits, burdens, and costs of
equal access; ensure universal, comprehensive coverage; and allocate re-
sources equitably and efficiently within the health sector.
416 See Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2220 (noting that public criticism of Oregon's
original heath care priority list based on cost-effectiveness analysis contributed to the decision
to adopt a different method of prioritizing health services).
417 See Medicaid Proposal, supra note 356, at 7; Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2220.
The HSC criteria for ranking involved the category's perceived value to the individual and to
society and the necessity of the types of interventions in a given category. See Medicaid Pro-
posal, supra note 356, at 7-9. For an interesting analysis that compares CEA with Oregon's
prioritization list, see Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Oregon's Medicaid Ranking and Cost-Effective-
ness: Is There any Relationship?, 16 MED. DECISION MAKING 99 (1996).
418 Medicaid Proposal, supra note 356, at 8; Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2221.
419 Medicaid Proposal, supra note 356, at 8; Care Priorities, supra note 57, at 2221.
420 See Medicaid Proposal, supra note 356, at 7-9.
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Developing this framework into a policy tool will be challenging.
However, many elements of it, such as determinations of medical appro-
priateness and medical necessity, cost-minimization analysis, and delib-
erative fora for reasoned judgement and patient input are already
available in certain forms.
Reasonable objections to this paradigm will arise. Some critics will
argue that society is unable to afford such a generous plan and will want
more assurance of cost savings or containment. Although the paradigm
seeks to use health resources more efficiently, it will not produce a flaw-
lessly efficient healthcare system, given the number of organizational,
institutional, and political obstacles that will likely impede its implemen-
tation. If greater health-system efficiency is achieved but healthcare
costs continue to rise, the American public must decide whether it is
willing to spend more on health care. Most health economists find this
stage of decision-making straightforward because they believe individu-
als should be free to spend as much as they like on goods they value
highly, provided that waste is eliminated. Recent studies suggest that
Americans' willingness to pay for health care exceeds current and even
projected costs of medical goods and services. 421
Another objection might come from some physicians who regard
clinical guidelines as "cookbook medicine," even though such guidelines
are designed to assist policy-making and not to replace clinical judgment.
But guidelines, combined with input from patients coupled with informa-
tion systems, help standardize health care while enabling physicians to
use their clinical judgment for patients with unique circumstances.
Working with such guidelines might be necessary for physicians to
regain decision-making authority and prevent micromanagement of pa-
tients by others, especially third party payers. Despite these objections,
the paradigm outlined above has many advantages and the potential to
replace the current unjust, wasteful, and costly system with more equita-
ble, efficient and compassionate health care.
421 David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change In Medicine Worth It?
When Costs and Benefits are Weighed Together, Technological Advances Have Proved to be
Worth Far More than their Costs, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 11 (2001).
